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In November 2008, after this report was written, the EC published a set of guidelines on how to
more effectively link mine action with development for future programming of EC mine action
over the 2008-2013 period1.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION PLEASE CONTACT

1

This Commission Staff working document, “Guidelines on European Community Mine Action 2008-2013” can be
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CONTENTS
ACRONYMS

i

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

iii

1. INTRODUCTION

1

2. GENERAL FINDINGS

4

OVERVIEW OF EC-FUNDED MINE ACTION INITIATIVES IN AFRICA

4

AMOUNT OF SUPPORT

4

COUNTRIES SUPPORTED

5

TYPE OF ORGANISATIONS SUPPORTED

6

MINE ACTION COMPONENTS SUPPORTED

7

EC-FUNDING RELATIVE TO TOTAL MINE ACTION FUNDING IN AFRICA
MINE ACTION IN EC STRATEGIES
THE GLOBAL MINE ACTION STRATEGY AND RECENT REFORMS TO AID POLICY

7
8
8

EC STRATEGIES FOR AFRICA

11

EC STRATEGIES FOR SUB-REGIONS IN AFRICA

12

EC COUNTRY STRATEGY PAPERS AND INDICATIVE PROGRAMMES

3. COUNTRY FINDINGS
ANGOLA

12

14
14

CONTEXT

14

THE MINE ACTION PROGRAMME

15

EC SUPPORT FOR MINE ACTION

16

KEY ISSUES
SOMALIA

17
18

CONTEXT

18

THE MINE ACTION PROGRAMME

19

OVERALL DEVELOPMENT PRIORITIES

21

EC SUPPORT FOR MINE ACTION

22

KEY ISSUES

22

SUDAN

23

CONTEXT

23

THE MINE ACTION PROGRAMME

24

EC SUPPORT FOR MINE ACTION

26

KEY ISSUES

27

REGIONAL OR MULTI-COUNTRY INITIATIVES

28

CONTEXT

28

EC SUPPORT FOR MINE ACTION

28

KEY ISSUES

29

4. CONCLUSIONS
RELEVANCE OF EC SUPPORT TO MINE ACTION IN AFRICA
GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE

30
30
30

RELEVANCE TO AFRICAN AND SUB-REGIONAL REQUIREMENTS

30

RELEVANCE TO COUNTRY REQUIREMENTS

30

Angola

30

Somalia

31

Sudan

31

EFFECTIVENESS OF EC SUPPORT TO MINE ACTION

31

ADDRESSING THE CONTAMINATION PROBLEMS

31

FOSTERING NATIONAL OWNERSHIP

33

SUPPORTING RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT PRIORITIES

34

COORDINATION BETWEEN THE EC AND OTHER AGENCIES SUPPORTING MINE ACTION

35

THE IMPACT OF DECONCENTRATION OF EC AID

36

THE IMPACT OF THE END OF DEDICATED MINE ACTION FUNDING & UNITS

37

OTHER ISSUES

39

THE NEED FOR STRATEGIC PLANS FOR NATIONAL MINE ACTION PROGRAMMES

39

MINE ACTION, PEACE AND SECURITY

40

MINE ACTION AND REGIONAL/SUB-REGIONAL PROGRAMMES

41

5. RECOMMENDATIONS
ANNEX 1 – TERMS OF REFERENCE

42
i

ANNEX 2 – ITINERARY AND LIST OF PEOPLE MET

v

ANNEX 3 – DOCUMENTS CONSULTED

ix

FIGURES
Figure 1 – Financial targets & estimated commitments for 2002-04 and 2005-07 ................................. iii
Figure 2 – Funding by year and by country ...................................................................................... iv
Figure 3 – International funding per landmine victim.......................................................................... v
Figure 4 – EC Funding commitments for Mine Action .......................................................................... 4
Figure 5 – Financial targets & estimated commitments for 2002-04 and 2005-07 .................................. 5
Figure 6 – Funding to NGOs & UN agencies ....................................................................................... 7
Figure 7 – EC mine action funding relative to total from international sources 2002-06 .......................... 8
Figure 8 – Programming influences for EC-funded Mine Action .......................................................... 10
Figure 9 – Estimated annual victims per million (high and low estimates) ........................................... 19
Figure 10 – Estimated funding per landmine victim .......................................................................... 33

TABLES
Table 1 – Estimated commitments by country (€ millions) .................................................................. 5
Table 2 – Mine Action in EC Country Strategy Papers ....................................................................... 13

TEXTBOXES
Textbox 1 – The objectives of the Mine Action Regulation and Strategy ................................................ 8
Textbox 2 – The Stability Instrument and Support for Mine Action ..................................................... 11
Textbox 3 – Roads, Rural Development, and the ‘Dutch disease’ in Angola ......................................... 15
Textbox 4 – The EU Policy on Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD)........................... 16
Textbox 5 – The UNDP Rule of Law and Security (ROLS) Programme ................................................. 20
Textbox 6 – Preparing the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) ................................... 21
Textbox 7 – The international dimension to mine action ................................................................... 39

ACRONYMS
AIDCO
AIDS
ANC
APL
APM
APMBC
APSA
AU
BAC
CASEVAC
CCW
CED
CIDA
CNIDAH

EuropeAid Cooperation Office
Auto Immune-Deficiency Syndrome
African National Congress
Anti-Personnel Landmines
Anti-Personnel Landmines
Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convetion
African Peace and Security Architecture
African Union
Battle Area Clearance
Casualty Evacuation
Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons of War
Executive Commission for Demining
Canadian International Development Agency
National Intersectoral Commission on Demining and
Humanitarian Assistance
CPA
Comprehensive Peace Agreement
CRMAO
Central Region Mine Action Office
CSP
Country Strategy Paper
DA
Dangerous Areas
DCA
DanChurch Aid
DDG
Danish Demining Group
DDR
Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
DFID
Department for International Development
DG DEV
European Commission Directorate General for Development
DG RELEX European Commission Directorate General for External
Relations
DRC
Democratic Republic of Congo
EC
European Commission
ECHO
European Community Humanitarian Aid Office
EDF
European Development Fund
EOD
Explosive Ordnance Disposal
ERW
Explosive Remnants of War
EU
European Union
FAA
Angolan Armed Forces
FAPLA
Angolan People's Armed Liberation Forces
FNLA
Angolan National Liberation Front
FPDO
Friends of Peace and Development Organisation
FSD
Fondation Suisse de Deminage (same as SFD)
GAC
Child Support Group
GDP
Gross Domestic Product
GICHD
Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining
GOA
Government of Angola
GoNU
Government of National Unity
GoS
Government of Sudan
GoSS
Government of South Sudan
GRN
National Reconstruction Office
GTZ
Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit und
Entwicklung
HAC
Humanitarian Aid Commission
HI
Handicap International
HPP
Humanitarian Plus Programme
ICMA
Inter-ministerial Committee on Mine Action (Somaliland)
IDP
Internally Displaced Person
IGAD
Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IMAS
International Mine Action Standards
IMATC
International Mine Action Training Centre
IMSMA
Information Management System for Mine Action
INAD
National Demining Institute (in Angola)
INAROEE National Institute for the Removal of Explosive Obstacles
and Devices
IND
National Demining Institute (in Mozambique)
INEA
Instituto Nacional de Estradas de Angola
JASMAR

Sudanese Association for Combating Landmines

JIDU
JMC
JNA
LIS
LMA
LRA
LRRD
M&E
MA
MAG
MAO
MDD
MDTF
MEDDS

Joint Integrated Demining Unit
Joint Military Commission
Joint Needs Assessment
Landmine Impact Survey
Landmine Action
Lord’s Resistance Army
Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development
Monitoring and Evaluation
Mine Action
Mines Advisory Group
Mine Action Office
Mine Detecting Dog
Multi Donor Trust Fund
Mechem Explosives and Drugs Detection System

MgM
MINARS
MONUA
MOU
MPLA
MRE
MRR&R
MSF
MVMMDS
NGO

People Against Mines, Germany
Ministry for Assistance and Social Reintegration
United Nations Mission of Observers in Angola
Memorandum of Understanding
People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola
Mine Risk Education
Ministry of Resettlement, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction
Doctors without Borders
Mechem Vehicle Mounted Mine Detection System
Non-Governmental Organisation

NMAA
NMAO
NPA
NSAL
NSMAD
OCHA
OLS
OSIL
PAM
PDA
PKO
PMAC
PPE
QA
QC
RAP
RDP
RENAMO
ROLS
RRM
RRP

National Mine Action Authority
National Mine Action Office
Norwegian Peoples Aid
New Sudan Authority on Landmines
New Sudan Mine Action Directorate
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance
Operation Lifeline Sudan
Operation Save Innocent Lives
World Food Programme
Personnel Digital Assistant
Peace Keeping Operation
Puntland Mine Action Centre
Personal Protective Equipment
Quality Assurance
Quality Control
Rapid Assistance Programme
Reconstruction and Development Programme
Mozambican National Resistance
Rule of Law and Security
Rapid Response Mechanism
Relief and Rehabilitation Programme

SAC
SAF
SALW
SCBL
SCPP
SFD
SHA
SIDA
SIMAS
SLIRI
SLR

Survey Action Center
Sudan Armed Forces
Small Arms and Light Weapons
Sudan Campaign to ban Landmines
Somali Civil Protection Programme
Swiss Federation for Demining (same as FSD)
Suspected Hazardous Area
Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
Sudan Integrated Mine Action Services
Sudan Landmine Information and Response Services
Sudan Landmine Response

SMAC
SNRC

Somaliland Mine Action Centre
Somali National Reconciliation Conference (adopted a
Transitional Federal Charter of the Somali Republic)
Traditional chief in Angola

Soba

EVALUATION OF EC-FUNDED MINE ACTION PROGRAMMES IN AFRICA
29.02.2008 | i

SOP
SPLA
SPLM
Spot UXO
SRCS
SRRC
SRSG
SSDC
SSRMAO
STABEX
SWAPO
TA
TFG
UNAVEM
UNCCAS
UNDG
UNDP

Standard Operating Procedure
Sudan People’s Liberation Army
Sudan People’s Liberation Movement
Isolated UXO which does not impact a community even
though it poses a possible threat
Somali Red Crescent Society
Sudan Relief and Reconciliation Council
Special Representative of the Secretary General (UN)
Southern Sudan Demining Commission
Southern Sudan Regional Mine Action Office
Système de Stabilisation des Recettes d'Exportation
South West African People’s Organisation
Technical Advisor
Transitional Federal Government
United Nations Angola Verification Mission
UN Common Country Assessment
United Nations Development Group
United Nations Development Programme

UNDP/BCPR
UNHCR
UNITA
UNJLC

UNDP Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
United Nations Joint Logistic Command

UNMAO
UNMAS
UNMIS
UNOPS
USD
UTA
UXO
VA
VTF
VVAF
WFP
Xeer
YEMAC

United Nations Mine Action Office
United Nations Mine Action Service
United Nations Mission in Sudan
United Nations Office for Project Services
United States Dollar
Technical and Administrative Unit
Unexploded Ordnance
Victim Assistance
Voluntary Trust Fund (of the UN)
Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation
World Food Programme
Somali customary law
Yemen Executive Mine Action Center

EVALUATION OF EC-FUNDED MINE ACTION PROGRAMMES IN AFRICA
29.02.2008 | ii

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The Evaluation of EC support for mine action in Africa is the first of six regional mine action
evaluations that the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) will
conduct or commission for the European Commission (EC).2 These regional evaluations followon from a Global Assessment of EC support for mine action completed in 2005.3 Given the broad
scope of a regional evaluation, no attempt was made to assess the performance of individual
projects; rather, the focus was on EC mine action strategy and programming issues at the country
and regional levels.
In addition to a document review, the evaluation team sent questionnaires to the EC Delegations
in those sub-Saharan African countries in which the EC has provided funding for mine action
since 2002, and conducted country missions to Angola, North and South Sudan, and Somalia
(Somaliland and Puntland).4 Findings from these missions are reported in a separate volume.
THE QUANTITY AND FOCUS OF EC SUPPORT FOR MINE ACTION IN AFRICA

Although it has proved impossible to compile a complete and accurate list of EC-financed mine
action projects,5 from the data compiled by the evaluation team it is clear that the EC has
provided over €90 million to mine action in Africa since 2002, with about two-thirds of this
committed from 2005-07 – the period covered by the Second EC Mine Action Strategy. The €90
million in funding exceeds the combined targets set in the two Mine Action Strategies.
Figure 1 – Financial targets & estimated commitments for 2002-04 and 2005-07
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Just over half of all EC6 funding for mine action in Africa has gone to Angola, but significant
support has also gone to Sudan, Ethiopia, DRC, Senegal, and Somalia. Total funding peaked in
2004 (largely because of new projects in Angola) and has been tapering-off since.

2

The Africa Evaluation was conducted by the GICHD. In Africa, the EC is
Gasser, R. and R. Keeley, Global Assessment of EC Mine Policy and Actions: 2002-2004.
4
In addition, the Evaluation Team Leader attended the joint EU-AU Security Dialogue Workshop, 18-20 April 2007 in
Addis Ababa.
5
This was a finding from the Global Assessment as well.
6
African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) countries receive assistance from the European Development Fund (EDF),
which itself is funded by contributions from members of the European Union (EU). In relation to EDF funding, EC
refers to the European Community rather than European Commission. African countries also have received mine action
3

EVALUATION OF EC-FUNDED MINE ACTION PROGRAMMES IN AFRICA
29.02.2008 | iii

Figure 2 – Funding by year and by country
25
20

€ millions

Other
Sudan

15

Somalia
10

Ethiopia
Angola

5
0
2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

The bulk of the funding has been for demining, mostly channelled through European NGOs.
However, the UNDP has been the single biggest recipient of EC funding for mine action in
Africa, receiving at least €27.4 million since 2002, often to support capacity development in the
national mine action authorities and centres.
RELEVANCE OF EC MINE ACTION SUPPORT IN AFRICA

Clearly, EC support for mine action in Africa has been relevant to the objectives and priorities
set-out in the mine action Regulations and Strategies. Financing has been provided to all pillars
of mine action, with the bulk going toward demining (as is appropriate).
Assistance to mine action is also relevant to both the EU Strategy for Africa7 and to the needs of
many African countries.8 On some measures, Africa is considered the continent most affected by
landmines, and the EC has allocated a significant proportion of its total mine action support to it,
with funds provided to 12 African countries. Since 2002, landmine contamination has been a
major humanitarian concern in certain countries in Africa; particularly in Angola and Sudan
following the peace agreements in those countries, when landmines threatened the return of
millions of refugees and IDPs and constrained the delivery of humanitarian assistance. In this
context, it is appropriate that more than half of all EC assistance to mine action was spent in
Angola and Sudan in the initial post-conflict years.
In addition, mine action has contributed significantly to peace building and the enhancement of
security at various places and times in Africa, and the EC has supported such initiatives. For
example, mine action was the first concrete programme of cooperation between the Government
of Sudan and the Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), serving as confidence
building measure leading to the cease fire and eventual Comprehensive Peace Agreement.
The pattern of assistance provided to mine action in Africa is also appropriate in terms of the EC
policy on Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD). Since 2005, the Delegation
in Angola has been encouraging demining NGOs to incorporate developmental objectives in their
proposals, and has provided funding for demining support to infrastructure reconstruction

assistance from the assessed aid budget European Commission. To avoid confusing the reader, we will ignore this
subtle distinction.
7
Particularly for the (i) Peace and Security, and (ii) trade and regional integration components of this strategy.
8
Mine action is also relevant to a number of EC Strategies in place for major sub-regions in Africa, most of which
have some provision for peace and security. However, no mine action projects have been funded by the regional
instruments in the period covered by this evaluation.
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projects.9 Recent EC-financed projects in Sudan have incorporated mine action support into
community development projects implemented by consortia of international and local NGOs.
Note that, although mine action appears relevant to the EU Strategy for Africa and at least some
of the (sub-) Regional Strategies and Indicative Programmes, there is no regional or sub-regional
EC mine action programme at the current time. All programming is done on a country-basis, even
though some contamination problems clearly involve multiple countries or have sub-regional
security implications.10
EFFECTIVENESS

This evaluation did not assess the performance of individual projects and we cannot, therefore,
comment in the operational effectiveness of the EC mine action portfolios in terms of results on
the ground. At a higher level, the programming decisions made by EC Delegations appear to have
been effective in terms of aligning mine action with the needs of the country (which, in failed
states and post-conflict situations, evolve rapidly). In Sudan, the EC supported early mine action
initiatives that contributed to the broader peace-building process. In Angola and Sudan, the
amount of funding for mine action rose dramatically in the immediate post-conflict period, when
landmine contamination can lead to a humanitarian crisis. In recent years, the Delegation in
Angola has sought to steer its implementing partners to focus increasingly on support to
reconstruction and development. In Angola as well, EC assistance has supported the development
of capacities in the provinces, where many Vice Governors appear to be committed to the mine
action programme even if some officials in Luanda are not.
At the same time, the case of Somalia relative to other African countries suggests that donor
programming mechanisms for mine action – including those of the EC – are not effective in
allocating aid across countries in accordance to need.11
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Figure 3 – International funding per landmine victim12

9

At the same time, a number of these NGOs appear not to have fully adjusted their approaches to focus on
development outcomes.
10
In 2002, €20 million was approved in Brussels for post-conflict recovery in Eritrea and Ethiopia (€10 million for
each country). As events turned out, only one project has been approved (€8 million for mine action in Ethiopia), and
this involved only Ethiopia.
11
The authors of the Global Assessment made a similar observation and recommended the EC employ multi-criteria
analysis to determine its allocations across countries in a transparent fashion. This approach could only be useful for
allocating the APL thematic budget, which no longer exists.
12
Annual averages for the two most recent years. See the report on the Somalia mission for details on data sources.
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EC assistance has been less effective in supporting the development of national capacities,
fostering national ownership, and coordinating with other agencies supporting mine action. This,
however, is not because the EC has ignored these issues; rather, it reflects a more systemic
problem in the mine action field, at least within Africa. The evaluation team has not come across
any fully adequate medium-term plans for capacity development or strategic plans for a national
mine action programme.13 In the absence of such plans, a single donor has no adequate
framework for its programming decisions, and coordination among donors is greatly hindered.
THE IMPACT OF DECONCENTRATION

14

There is no clear indication that deconcentration has yet had an effect on either the quantity or
quality of EC assistance to mine action in Africa. Over time, however, we would expect both
benefits and adverse effects. On the positive side, the EC Delegations are in a better position to
devise a programme appropriate to the evolving political and economic realities of a country, and
to adapt the future programme in light of the successes and failures of the current portfolio of
mine action projects.
However, there invariably are challenges common to all efforts at deconcentrating aid
programmes, including:
•
•
•
•

country offices are generally too small to have specialists available for each sector or
field
officials responsible for mine action are typically covering one or more other sectors as
well
staff rotation policies mean that it is extremely difficult for country-level offices to
maintain institutional memory and, therefore, programming continuity
personnel in country-level offices have limited access to global policy debates and to
lessons learned and innovations emerging from other countries.

THE IMPACT OF THE END OF DEDICATED FUNDING AND THE REDUCTION IN THE STAFF COMPLEMENT AT
HEADQUARTERS WORKING ON MINE ACTION

Support from a headquarters-level unit or focal point could help overcome some of the challenges
inherent in the deconcentration effort by, for example, providing policy and technical advice,
backstopping Delegations when there is a rotation of the officer responsible for mine action, and
identifying appropriately qualified experts to assist the EC Delegations with their mine action
projects. Unfortunately the parallel effort to simplify EC aid delivery mechanisms has also led to
the elimination of the APL thematic budget line and a reduction in the number of staff in Brussels
working on mine action.15

13
Such plans to institute a ‘programme-based approach’ should be formulated by the recipient government in
consultation with donors and other mine action stakeholders. In failed states or the immediate post-conflict period, the
lead UN agency for mine action in a country may need to prepare the strategic plan for the programme, or support the
government’s capacity to prepare such a plan.
14
Within the EC, ‘deconcentration’ is the specific term used by the EC to refer to the delegation of more authority to
its Delegations, and ‘decentralisation’ signifies the delegation of responsibilities to authorities in the beneficiary
countries. In the aid effectiveness literature, decentralisation is the general term used in reference to efforts at having
key decisions made within the recipient country, embracing both EC the concepts – ‘deconcentration’ and
‘decentralisation’.
15
There was a sector within the RELEX A4 unit responsible for the APL budget line and, more generally, the EC Mine
Action Strategy. There remains a small staff complement, but its mandate covers conventional disarmament rather than
simply mine action. There was also one position in the European Aid Cooperation Office responsible for mine action
projects. This position now covers the Stability Instrument.
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The loss of dedicated funding for mine action is likely to have an impact on future EC funding. In
broad terms, the EC Mine Action Regulations and subsequent Strategies sought to advance
humanitarian, developmental, and Treaty objectives.16 While the responsibilities for EC
Delegations extend beyond humanitarian and development assistance, the development
programme typically dominates relations with poor countries, including much of Africa. As well,
the bulk of the financial resources available for programming to EC Delegations in Africa comes
from the European Development Fund (EDF). Accordingly, the Delegations are likely to view
mine action through a development lens. They are unlikely to be enthusiastic about supporting
mine action in countries where landmines are neither a humanitarian nor a development priority.
How then will the EC be able to support countries that:
• have some explosives contamination which is…
• not a development priority identified by the government, when the country…
• is addressing its mine contamination responsibly, but…
• is too poor to meet its Treaty obligations?17
The reduction in the mine action staff complement at headquarters will also diminish the EC’s
ability to play a significant role in international mine action forums, and in terms of coordination
at the level of donor capitals, particularly with the EU member states.18
RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendation 1 – Re-establish a strong focal point for mine action in Brussels to:
•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•

represent the EC in international forums
coordinate with EU member states on mine action issues
advise Delegations concerning mine action experts who could assist Delegations (see
recommendation 4)
assume responsibility for programming of mine action thematic funding (i.e., either a
budget line or, more likely, a ‘window’ within an established financing instrument),
should this be re-established (see recommendation 2)
assist in establishing mine action programmes financed by regional programmes (see
recommendation 3)
implement recommendations from the Global Assessment
provide policy and programming advice to the Delegations
assist delegates who are new to mine action.

Recommendation 2 – Assess whether a thematic funding ‘window’ within existing budget
instruments can be created at headquarters level to support Treaty implementation and global
issues.
Recommendation 3 – Review the options for modest mine action programmes at the regional or
(sub-)regional level in Africa,19 designed to:
16

The anti-personnel landmine regulations were adopted in 2001 as a direct response to the Convention on the
Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and their Destruction, Regulation
(EC) No 1724/2001, par. 6).
17
Zambia is an example from Africa.
18
The Delegations in Geneva and New York attend the meetings on anti-personnel landmines and conventional
disarmament. But these officials are not as well placed to address issues relating to EC and other donor support to, for
example, mine-affected countries.
19
In at least some regions, it probably would be more appropriate to have a focal unit and fund covering security
system reform issues, including landmines/ERW.
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•
•

•

provide an expert focal point to provide strategic advice to EC Delegations, regional
institutions, and national authorities on mine action issues
fund modest initiatives to address contamination that is clearly of a multi-country or
regional nature (e.g. landmines laid by Rhodesian and South African forces in the former
front line states; border minefields between Ethiopia and Somalia; cross-border
contamination in the Great Lakes States)
provide modest funding to countries in which the EC Delegation has completed its exit
strategy for mine action (see recommendation 6)

Recommendation 4 – Identify and perhaps pre-qualify mine action experts who could advise
Delegations on mine action issues.
Recommendation 5 – Delegations should request proper strategic plans from national mine action
authorities and/or the lead UN agency for mine action in each country.
A common problem with the national mine action programmes in Africa is the lack of an
adequate strategic plan that would provide a framework for EC programming decisions
and would facilitate donor coordination (both among themselves and with the
government). The lack of such plans also greatly complicates the programming and
coordination tasks of the EC Delegations.
Recommendation 6 – EC Delegations should formulate exit strategies for their support to mine
action.
Exit strategies are particularly important for mine action as demining involves the use of
expensive, often specialised equipment, and demining operators often have large
numbers of local personnel who should be given fair notice well prior to the termination
or downsizing of the programme. In addition, many local staff are former military
personnel or otherwise trained in the use of explosives, and could represent a real threat
if unfairly or summarily dismissed.20
Recommendation 7 – For countries where the EC has large mine action portfolios, commission
country-level reviews of EC-funded mine action.
Our impression is that reviews of country mine action programmes will be more valuable
to EC Delegations than a regional evaluation. Some Delegations have commissioned
evaluations of individual projects, which can assess operational and technical issues and
the performance of implementing partners, but which provide less guidance to the
Delegations on their essential task – that of programming EC assistance for mine action
in a particular country over a specific time.

20
Such problems have already occurred in Mozambique in 2005 (the sudden collapse of the UNDP Accelerated
Demining Program) and Somaliland in the early 1990s (forcing the emergency evacuation of the international
personnel of the firm Rimfire).
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1. INTRODUCTION
BACKGROUND

In 2001 the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament adopted two Regulations on the
reinforcement of the EU response against Anti-Personnel Landmines (APL).21 These (referred to
collectively as “the Regulation”) laid the foundation of the European integrated and focused
policy.
Article 13, paragraph 1 of the EC Regulation states that: The Commission shall regularly assess
operations financed by the Community in order to establish whether the objectives of the
operations have been achieved and to provide guidelines for improving the effectiveness of future
operations. The APL Regulation goes on to state: Every three years after entry into force of this
Regulation, the Commission shall submit to the European Parliament an overall assessment of
all Community mine actions… (Article 14)
The EC Mine Action Strategy and Multi-annual Indicative Programme, 2005-200722 further
specifies that more specific, geographic, evaluations of EC-funded mine actions, analysing the
results and their impact will be undertaken to complement the overall assessment.
To implement these provisions, the EC:
• Commissioned a global assessment of EC mine policy and actions over the period 20022004;
• Entered into an agreement with The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian
Demining (GICHD) to, inter alia, manage the programme of regional evaluations to
identify lessons learned within EC-funded mine action projects in the following
regions:23
Africa
Asia-Pacific

Caucasus-Central Asia
Europe

Latin America
Middle East

The Report from the Global Assessment was issued in March 2005,24 while the agreement with
the GICHD was concluded in December that year.
The objective of the Global Assessment was to determine to what extent the objectives and
means set in the APL Regulation had been complied with and used in terms of strategy,
programming, commitments and implementation. The regional evaluations will complement the
Global Assessment by focusing on (i) relevant conclusions and recommendations from the
21

Regulation (EC) 1724/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2001 concerning action against
anti-personnel landmines in developing countries (OJ L 234, 1.9.2001, p.1) and Regulation (EC) 1725/2001 of the
European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2001 concerning action against anti-personnel landmines in third
countries other than developing countries (OJ L 234, 1.9.2001, p.6). The provisions are similar and we quote from
Regulation (EC) 1724/2001.
22
This is the second strategy and multi-year indicative programme since the adoption of the EC Regulation: the first
covered the period 2002-04.
23
Additional objectives of the EC-GICHD Agreement are to:
provide a repository service for reports from evaluations and similar studies;
train people from mine affected countries in evaluation;
support the participation of key players from mine-affected countries in official meetings relating to the Mine Ban
Convention (APMBC).
24
Gasser, Russell and Robert Keeley, Global Assessment of EC Mine Policy and Actions: 2002-2004.
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Global Assessment and (ii) EC mine action strategy and programming issues at the country and
regional levels. Thus, the evaluation will not assess the efficiency, effectiveness, and impact of
individual projects, except to illustrate changes since the Global Assessment or critical
programming issues.
OVERALL OBJECTIVE OF THE EVALUATION:

To provide systematic and objective assessments of EC-funded mine actions in Africa to generate
credible and useful lessons for decision-makers, allowing them to improve the planning and
management of existing and future mine action projects, programmes, and policies.
SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES

1. To assess the relevance of EC-funded mine activities vis-à-vis:
• the geographic and thematic priorities defined in the Strategies for 2002-2004 and 20052007;
• national and regional needs, strategies, and priorities;
• EC Country Strategy Papers and National Indicative Programmes for mine-affected
countries in Africa;
• EC strategy documents for Africa or major sub-regions in Africa;
2. To analyse the allocation of funds among mine-affected states in Africa, and across the
various components of mine action (survey, clearance, MRE, etc.);
3. To assess the effectiveness of EC-funded mine action support in:
• addressing the landmine & UXO problems in mine-affected partner countries
• fostering national ownership and the development of local capacities;
• supporting the overall development and rehabilitation priorities/ programmes of the
beneficiary countries;
4. To assess the coordination among the EC and other agencies supporting mine action in a
country (national; UN; donors; international NGOs; etc.);
5. To assess the impact of deconcentration on the planning and delivery of EC support to mine
action in Africa;
6. To assess the potential impact of the end of the specific budget line for anti-personnel
landmines on future mine action support from the EC to Africa;
7. To make recommendations to improve the identification, the definition, the implementation
and the impact of EC-funded mine projects;
8. To generate recommendations to enhance the opportunities for cross-fertilisation among mine
action programmes in Africa and globally.
TERMS OF REFERENCE

The full Terms of Reference (TORs) are attached as Annex 1.
STUDY METHODOLOGY

The evaluation entailed: (i) preliminary planning and data collection; (ii) selection of ‘focus
countries’ to which missions would be undertaken; (iii) desk research, including the review of
recent evaluations of mine action programmes in Africa; (iv) missions to the focus countries
(Angola, Somalia, and Sudan); and (v) analysis and reporting. During the initial phase, two
rounds of questionnaires were submitted to the EC-Brussels mine action team and to EU
delegations in African countries that had received EC funding for mine action. The responses
allowed the identification of the key evaluation issues25 and the selection of focus countries.

25

The Africa evaluation is the first of the six regional evaluations, so extended consultations took place to prepare the
Terms of Reference, which will serve as the model for the other regions.
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Country mission reports were drafted for each of the focus countries and distributed widely for
comments before the overall report was written.
The Evaluation Team comprised Ted Paterson, GICHD Head of Evaluation (Team Leader); Vera
Bohle, GICHD Evaluation Officer; Léonie Barnes, GICHD National Mine Action Standards
Officer; Mohamed Ahmed, GICHD Regional Coordinator for MENA and East Africa; and
Pamela Rebelo, a consultant based in Mozambique who has conducted a number of mine action
evaluations. The country missions were organised as follows:
Country
Angola
Somalia
Sudan

Timing
28 March-4 April
24 March-6 April
21-27 March
10-20 April

Team Members
Vera Bohle & Pamela Rebelo
Ted Paterson & Mohamed Ahmed
Vera Bohle (to Khartoum)
Léonie Barnes (to Juba & Yei)

In addition, Ted Paterson attended the joint EU-AU Security Dialogue Workshop, 18-20 April
2007 in Addis Ababa, where a range of concerns including landmines, explosive remnants of war
(ERW), small arms and light weapons (SALW), and disarmament, demobilisation and
reintegration (DDR) were discussed.
Reporting was done in two stages. Separate reports were first prepared for the three focus
countries, with drafts submitted to EC headquarters and the EC Delegations and, subsequently, to
other stakeholders (national mine action centres, UN agencies, demining NGOs, etc.) for their
review and comments. The individual country reports were then finalised and the main report for
the regional evaluation prepared.
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2. GENERAL FINDINGS
OVERVIEW OF EC-FUNDED MINE ACTION INITIATIVES IN AFRICA
AMOUNT OF SUPPORT
It has proven to be extraordinarily difficult to compile a complete and accurate listing of EC
funded mine action projects.26 Our best estimate is that the EC has committed at least €91.8
million for mine action in 12 countries of Africa since 2002.27 Of this, approximately €51 million
was committed in 2005-07 – the period covered by the second EC Mine Action Strategy.
Figure 4 – EC Funding commitments for Mine Action
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Funds came from the EDF,28 ECHO, the dedicated APL budget line, and at least one other special
budget line (Rapid Response Mechanism – RRM29). As well, in Sudan the Community Based
Relief and Rehabilitation Programme (RRP), with €50 million in STABEX funding30 at its
disposal, has granted €10.7 million to two NGO consortia for projects that incorporate mine
action.31 Clearly, some of the officers responsible for mine action in the EC Delegations have
shown great initiative in obtaining funds from sources outside the thematic budget line and the
current EDF.
The €50.9 million committed in 2005-07 is almost precisely in line with the financial target set in
26
This difficulty was also highlighted in the report on the Global Assessment of EC support to mine action. Difficulties
include confusion between planned and committed figures, the inclusion of demining sub-components of development
projects, the transfer of project files from Brussels to the relevant EC Delegations, the fact that funds came through a
variety of EC funding mechanisms, and the fact that different officers compiled different lists over the years.
27
In order of the amount of funds committed: Angola, Sudan, Ethiopia, DRC, Senegal, Mozambique, Somalia,
Burundi, Eritrea, Uganda, Guinea Bissau, Tunesia.
28
Including, for Sudan, the EDF Humanitarian Plus Programmes (HPP 1 & 2).
29
The Rapid Reaction Mechanism was created by EC Council Regulation No 381/2001 “…to allow the Community to
respond in a rapid, efficient and flexible manner, to situations of urgency or crisis or to the emergence of crisis.” This
was administered via a separate budget line, managed by Brussels (similar to the APL budget line).
30
STABEX (Système de Stabilisation des Recettes d'Exportation) was an EC compensatory financing scheme to
smooth export earnings from agricultural commodities for ACP countries. It was part of the Lomé Convention, and
abolished by the Cotonou Agreement in 2002.
31
MAG is providing mine action services for one consortium, which DanChurchAid (DCA) covers the second. The
Evaluation Team has been unable to determine how much of this funding has been reserved for mine action, so this is
not included in our figures.
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the second EC Mine Action Strategy (€51 million, including €13 million from the AP line). The
financial targets for mine action funding to Africa for the entire period since 2002 have been
exceeded.
Figure 5 – Financial targets & estimated commitments for 2002-04 and 2005-07
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A significant proportion of total EC funding for mine action goes to Africa. While it is difficult to
reconcile funding data from different sources, the records we have compiled for Africa amount to
over one-third of all EC funding for mine action reported by Landmine Monitor for the period
2002-06. As well, the proportion going to Africa appears to have increased.

2002-04
2005-06
Total

Total EC funding to
mine action
€145.2 million
€107.8 million
€253.0 million

EC funding to mine
action in Africa
€40.9 million
€50.9 million
€91.8 million

% to
Africa
28.1%
47.2%
36.3%

Sources: Total EC funding – Landmine Monitor; Funding for Africa – our figures

COUNTRIES SUPPORTED
The data we have compiled indicate that just over half of all EC funding for mine action in Africa
has gone to Angola. Sudan has been the next biggest recipient country in Africa (14% of total EC
funding for mine action since 2002), followed by Ethiopia (10%), DRC (5%), Senegal (5%), and
Somalia (4%). Funding to most countries was reasonably steady or increased in the second
period, but funding to both Eritrea and Mozambique fell significantly in 2005-07 compared to the
previous period.
Table 1 – Estimated commitments by country (€ millions)
Angola
Burundi
DR Congo
Eritrea
Eritrea / Ethiopia
Ethiopia
Guinea Bissau

2002-04
10.4
0.0
2.4
1.6
1.0
1.0
0.6

2005-07
37.3
2.4
1.9
0.0
0.0
8.0
0.0

Total
47.7
2.4
4.3
1.6
1.0
9.0
0.6

%
52%
3%
5%
2%
1%
10%
1%
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2002-04
2.9
0.0
1.5
7.2
0.0
0.1
28.7

Mozambique
Senegal
Somalia
Sudan
Tunisia
Uganda
Total

2005-07
0.5
4.2
1.8
5.4
0.5
1.0
63.1

Total
3.4
4.2
3.3
12.6
0.5
1.1
91.8

%
4%
5%
4%
14%
1%
1%
100%

Financing targets for individual countries for the 2005-07 period were, for the most part, met or
exceeded. The exceptions were:
Eritrea

Mozambique

Target
€2.0

Our estimate
€0.0

€2.0

€0.5

Senegal

€10.0

€4.2

Somalia

€3.5

€1.8

Apparent Reason
The Eritrean government expelled
demining NGOs and repeatedly disrupted
the work of the UNMEE mission
Poor performance by UNDP and IND on an
earlier grant
The €10 million in planned EDF funding
could not have been fully used given large
grants from France?
The EC Delegation for Somalia do not view
mine action as a priority and did not
provide the EDF funding shown in the
indicated plan.

In each case, the reason for not providing the targeted amount of funding appears reasonable.

TYPE OF ORGANISATIONS SUPPORTED
The bulk of EC funding for mine action in Africa has been channelled via NGOs, with most of
the rest going to UN agencies (particularly the UNDP).
The UNDP has been the single biggest recipient of EC funding for mine action in Africa,
receiving at least €27.4 million since 2002. Among the international NGOs, Mines Advisory
Group (MAG) has received over €9.7 million in EC grants since 2002, while HALO Trust (€5.3
million), MgM (€4.5 million), Landmine Action (LMA – €4.3 million), Norwegian Peoples Aid
(NPA – €3.7 million), Intersos (€3.0 million), Survey Action Center (SAC – €2.5 million),
Handicap International (HI – €2.1 million), and Danish Church Aid (DCA – €1.9 million) have
also received significant sums for their mine action work.
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Figure 6 – Funding to NGOs & UN agencies

Other/unknown, 13%

NGOs, 51%

UN agencies, 35%

MINE ACTION COMPONENTS SUPPORTED
It proved impossible to obtain complete and accurate data on the breakdown of financial
commitments by mine action component, in part because many projects are for ‘integrated mine
action’ (i.e. covering more than one mine action ‘pillar’ – demining; MRE; stockpile destruction;
victim assistance; and advocacy).
Incomplete figures show that at least €5.7 million was allocated specifically to capacity building32
since 2002, with smaller sums going for Landmine Impact Surveys (at least €2.8 million),
stockpile destruction (at least €1.5 million), victim assistance (at least €1.4 million), and MRE (at
least €0.8 million). In total, these allocations to non-demining components amounted to 13.3% of
all funding for mine action, although a number of the other projects would have incorporated
some capacity building, MRE, and victim assistance activities. Clearly however, the bulk of
funding went for demining, as is appropriate.33
EC-FUNDING RELATIVE TO TOTAL MINE ACTION FUNDING IN AFRICA
The EC has been a major contributor to mine action in Africa, and perhaps the largest single
donor agency. While data problems mean the figures are only indicative, the following graph
suggests that EC contributions ranged from 39% of total international funding for the period
2002-06 for Ethiopia, to 5% in Mozambique.

32

Projects focusing on capacity building, victim assistance, and MRE typically would have included support for
activities that some in the mine action community refer to as ‘advocacy.’ In addition, since 2006 the EC has provided
financial contributions to the Sponsorship Programme, which finances the attendance of delegates from poor mineaffected states (including many from Africa) at meetings of States Parties. As such, EC mine action support to Africa
has embraced all ‘pillars’ of mine action.
33
Demining = survey, marking, and clearance.
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USD millions

Figure 7 – EC mine action funding relative to total from international sources 2002-06
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MINE ACTION IN EC STRATEGIES
The basic programming framework for EC support to mine action in any country is made-up
most directly by (i) the EC Country Strategy Paper, (ii) the national mine action strategy and
programme, and until recently, (iii) the EC Mine Action Strategy. However, Country Strategy
Papers and national mine action strategies are in turn influenced by a number of other policies
and strategies issued by European, African, and national authorities.
On the European side, the EC aid delivery system is quite complex, with DG External Relations
(RELEX) and DG Development (DEV) responsible for aid policy (the latter agency also manages
programming for ACP countries) plus a separate Directorate (EuropeAid Cooperation Office or
AIDCO) for the implementation of the EC assessed budget for aid and for the European
Development Fund (EDF) covering the ACP countries. In addition, humanitarian aid is managed
by the European Community Humanitarian Aid Department (ECHO).

THE GLOBAL MINE ACTION STRATEGY AND RECENT REFORMS TO AID
POLICY
Until 2006, there were hundreds of specific EU regulations empowering EC assistance for
specific aid purposes, including the two Regulations for Mine Action. These established both
policy guidance and the APL thematic budget line. RELEX then formulated the two EC
Strategies for Mine Action, covering 2002-04 and 2005-07 respectively. These documents
outlined how the Commission would implement the EU mine action policy and provided an
overall strategic focus for EC mine action programming.
Textbox 1 – The objectives of the Mine Action Regulation and Strategy
The twin Regulations adopted in 2001 were adopted as a direct response to the Convention
on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and
on Their Destruction (Ottawa Convention). Thus, the Regulations were explicitly aimed at Treaty
implementation as well as humanitarian and development objectives.
Similarly, the EC Mine Action strategies specify commitment to the Mine Ban Treaty as a criterion
for assistance, along with humanitarian and development needs, strategic important to the EU,
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effectiveness of the national mine action programme, and coherence with the wider assistance
programme.
It is clear therefore, that both the Regulations and the Strategies specified disarmament (i.e.
Treaty implementation), humanitarian, and developmental objectives.

The 2005 Global Assessment of the EC Policy and Actions for mine action found that EC staff
have consistently sought to achieve high standards and the EC manages its mine action
programme at least as well as other similar international donors (p. v), and provided a number
of recommendations for further enhancing the policy and its implementation. However, broader
reforms to EU aid policies and institutions meant the recommendations for mine action could not,
for the most part, be implemented. Most fundamentally, the broader reforms led to the
replacement of the hundreds of aid policy regulations – including those specific to mine action –
with a handful of broader regulations establishing a limited number of geographic and thematic
instruments. As a result, the thematic budget line for anti-personnel landmines disappeared and
the headquarters staff complement dedicated to mine action was reduced in number.
A complimentary element of EU aid system reform was a programme of deconcentration, in
which the Delegations in developing countries were given greater responsibility and authority for
the formulation and implementation of EC aid programmes. As correctly noted in the Global
Assessment, there are both advantages and disadvantages associated with deconcentration vis-àvis EC support for mine action. The fundamental advantage is that the EU Delegations are better
positioned to monitor the political and economic developments in each recipient country, and to
align EC development assistance with the recipient country’s development priorities.34 However,
the EC Delegations do not have personnel with specialist knowledge on mine action, with the
expertise to fully assess the quality of mine action programmes and projects, including the
technical aspects, or to properly monitor the performance of the EC’s partners responsible for
implementing the projects (typically, international NGOs and UN agencies).35
Thus, programming decisions for EC support for mine action are the result of a wide range of
influences, many of which are depicted on the following page. From the EC itself, there is the
overarching strategy – the European Consensus on Development – which identifies nine primary
areas of activity:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

trade and regional integration;
the environment and the sustainable management of natural resources;
infrastructure, communications and transport;
water and energy;
rural development, territorial planning, agriculture and food security;
governance, democracy, human rights and support for economic and institutional
reforms;
conflict prevention and fragile states;
human development; and
social cohesion and employment. (p. 3)

34

This is in line with the international efforts to enhance aid effectiveness, encapsulated in the Paris Declaration on Aid
Effectiveness, espousing the principles of (recipient) ownership, harmonisation, alignment, results, and mutual
accountability.
35
Even when there were small units in Brussels focusing on mine action, the Global Assessment found that “Proposal
and project assessment has not included a rigorous technical component, and this has led to some inefficiency.” (p. vi)
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Figure 8 – Programming influences for EC-funded Mine Action
Budget

Overarching EC
Aid Strategy

EC MA
Strategy
(ended 2006)
Stability
Instrument
(since Nov 2006)
ECHO
programming

Country
Strategy
Papers

EU Strategy for
Africa

National Mine
Action Strategy
Sector
Strategies
EC Mine
Action
Projects

Specific EC
Country
Programmes

Africa
Peace
Facility

National
Development
Strategy

National Mine
Action
Programmes

Key African Institutions
Regional
Organisations

African Union

EVALUATION OF EC-FUNDED MINE ACTION PROGRAMMES IN AFRICA
29.02.2008 | 10

The overall strategy provides the framework for individual country strategies and influences
ECHO programming and the actions supported by special instruments such as the APL budget
line and (more recently) the Stability Instrument (see Textbox) which, together, make-up the EC
aid programmes in specific countries. In line with aid effectiveness principles, the EC country
strategies are also influenced by the recipient country’s own development priorities, normally
outlined in a national development plan/PRSP which in turn should be based on sector strategies
and the availability of financial resources. For EC support to mine action, programming decisions
should also be in-line with the national mine action strategy (where this exists).
Textbox 2 – The Stability Instrument and Support for Mine Action
The Stability Instrument* empowers Community short-term (up to 18 months) technical and
financial assistance in response to a situation of crisis or emerging crisis, including assistance for
mine action, specified as follows: support for measures to address, within the framework of
Community cooperation policies and their objectives, the socio-economic impact on the civilian
population of antipersonnel landmines, unexploded ordnance or explosive remnants of war;
activities financed under this Regulation shall cover risk education, victim assistance, mine
detection and clearance and, in conjunction therewith, stockpile destruction; (Article 3, par. h)
In addition, the Instrument makes provision for assistance to support for the rehabilitation and
reintegration of the victims of armed conflict, including measures to address the specific needs of
women and children; (Article 3, par. k). This would include landmine survivors.
In comparison, the former Mine Action Regulations and Strategies had a broader range of
objectives – disarmament (Treaty implementation), humanitarian, and development. However,
the Stability Instrument can provide only relatively short-term support for mine action in crisis
situations to strengthen linkages between relief, rehabilitation and development and restore the
conditions necessary for long-term development assistance. Thus, there is now no specialised
instrument to support mine action with either long-term development or disarmament in mind.**
* REGULATION (EC) No 1717/2006 establishing the Instrument for Stability, 15 Nov. 2006. This also makes
for provision for assistance to various aspects of Security System Reform, including demobilisation and
reintegration of armed forces, and elements of small arms, light weapons (SALW) programming.
** Article 4(1) of the Stability Instrument does provide for longer-term assistance for …strengthening the
capacity of law enforcement and judicial and civil authorities involved in the fight against terrorism and
organised crime, including illicit trafficking of… firearms and explosive materials.

EC STRATEGIES FOR AFRICA
In the case of African countries, EC programming decisions will also be influenced by the EU
Strategy for Africa (adopted in late 2005), and by the continuing EU-AU dialogue aimed at
forging a Strategic Partnership. This will focus on four ‘clusters’ of issues, including Peace and
Security. Even before the adoption of the EU Strategy for Africa, in 2004 the EU established the
African Peace Facility to support African peace support operations and capacity building in the
areas of peace and security.36 This instrument was started with €250 million, but more funds have
since been added.
The evolving EU-AU partnership – and particularly its Peace and Security elements – could have
a growing influence on the scope and nature of EC support for mine action. For example, in some
36
A central goal of the capacity building is to support the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), with the
African Union (AU) and its Peace and Security Council at the centre.
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countries mine action support may be viewed through a ‘security lens’. In other cases, landmine
contamination affects key regional transport arteries,37 which constrains trade and regional
integration. As well, the EU-AU partnership envisages a growing role for the AU and the key
African Regional Organisations, which conceivable could play a role in mine action.38

EC STRATEGIES FOR SUB-REGIONS IN AFRICA
In addition to Country Strategies and the new EU Strategy for Africa, the EC issued regional
strategies/indicative programmes for 2002-2007 covering:
•
•
•
•

Eastern and Southern Africa, with an indicative programme of €223 million, 5-10% of
which could be for “Conflict prevention, resolution and management;”
Central Africa, with an indicative programme of €55 million, of which 5-10% could be
for conflict prevention and political dialogue;
West Africa, with an indicative programme of €235 million, with €35 million reserved
for conflict prevention and good governance;
Southern African Development Community, with an indicative programme of €101
million, of which 20% is reserved for other (i.e. non-focal) programmes.

In addition, the EU has adopted a specific strategy for the Horn of Africa,39 covering the
Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) members – Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea,
Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, and Uganda. This focuses on regional security concerns including the
Ethiopia/Eritrea conflict, Somalia, and Sudan.
Mine action is not addressed explicitly in any of these regional strategies. However, all the
strategies envisage support for conflict prevention and other peace and security issues, which
could include programmes to deal with the legacies of war, including landmines and ERW. As
well, the Regional Strategy for Southern Africa mentions possibility of additional support to the
SADC Landmine Programme.40

EC COUNTRY STRATEGY PAPERS AND INDICATIVE PROGRAMMES
Landmine contamination and mine action are mentioned in some, but not all of the CSPs for
African countries that have received EC funding for mine action from 2002-07. In some cases,
landmine contamination is mentioned as a problem, but there is no mention of EC support to
address the problem.

37
For example, Angolan railways used to be important for transporting minerals from Zambia and the DR Congo to
international markets, and these railways are only now being reconstructed.
38
Recently, Africa’s landmine and other ERW problems have now been mentioned in the Africa-EU Strategic
Partnership, and the Action Plan for 2008-2010 mentions activities to enhance capacity building, networking,
cooperation and exchange of information Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW), Explosive Remnants of War (ERW)
and Anti-Personnel Landmines (APM), as well as fight against illicit trafficking. (p. 6)
39
Strategy for Africa: An EU regional political partnership for peace, security and
development in the Horn of Africa, 20 Oct. 2006.
40
This SADC programme received significant funding (€5 million?) prior to the adoption of the Strategy for 20022007. Apparently, the bulk of the funding was never spent.
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Table 2 – Mine Action in EC Country Strategy Papers
Country
Angola
DRC
Ethiopia
Eritrea
Guinea Bissau
Mozambique
Senegal
Somalia
Sudan
Uganda

Contamination mentioned
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No

EC support for mine action mentioned
Yes – as part of rural development/food security
No
Only past support for mine risk education
Yes – as part of the post-conflict rehabilitation
programme
Yes – support from the APL thematic budget line
No
No
Yes – support from the APL thematic budget line
Yes – as part of sustainable livelihoods and DDR
No
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3. COUNTRY FINDINGS

ANGOLA
CONTEXT
Angola is a huge, sparsely populated country – bigger than France, Spain and Portugal combined,
but with an estimated population of only 16 million. Following a long struggle, it achieved
independence from Portugal in 1975, but then suffered from continuing, often intense conflict for
most of the period until the 2002 death of Joseph Savimbi, the leader of the main rebel faction
(UNITA).
The conflicts led to extensive contamination. Until recently, some reports stated that vast areas –
up to 400,000 km2 (35% of the country!) – was suspected of contamination, but the Landmine
Impact Survey (LIS) has now reduced this estimate by over 99% to between 1,239 km2 and 207
km2 (upper and lower bounds, respectively). Still, almost 2,000 communities, home to an
estimated 2.4 million people (15% of the population), remain impacted to some degree.
Thousands of Angolans have been killed or injured by landmines and other ERW, but the number
of victims appears to be falling quickly,41 due both to mine action and the fact that most refugees
and IDPs have returned or re-settled permanently.
Rich in oil, diamonds, and other natural resources, Angola has experienced rapid economic
growth since the conflict ended, and the government has now shifted from emergency postconflict measures to large reconstruction and development investments. However, most Angolans
remain extremely poor and still lack access to basic public services. Average life expectancy at
birth is only 41 years (lower than the overall average for Sub-Saharan Africa); under-five child
mortality is 260 per 1,000 live births (the second highest rate in the world); almost half of
Angola’s children suffer from malnutrition; and less than 20% of the population has access to
electricity. Income distribution – already among the most unequal in the world – appears to be
increasing.42 While these problems are legacies of conflict to some degree, corruption also
hampers progress – Angola is viewed as one of the most corrupt countries in the world, ranking
147 out of 179 countries in the Transparency International index for 2007.
Rapidly increasing government revenues, coupled with large loans from China and the fact that
oil is of such geopolitical importance, mean that Angola is not dependant on foreign donors and
international financial institutions. Donors do provide significant funding, motivated in part at
least by the continued poverty, but they appear to have limited policy leverage over the
Government.
Since the end of the war, the Government has done a good job on most macro-economic
measures, and is correctly embarking on a huge infrastructure reconstruction programme that will
reconnect Angola’s vast interior to urban and international markets, another problem looms on
the horizon that promises to be even more challenging to the country’s economic managers, and
which could prove devastating to the rural population.
41

Victims recorded by the LIS fell from 195 in 2004 to 133 in 2005
During the 1990s, Angola’s Gini coefficient rose from 0.54 to 0.62 (a higher number means greater inequality) –
significantly higher even than other African oil producers with acknowledged inequality problems: Nigeria (0.51) and
Cameroon (0.44).
42
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Textbox 3 – Roads, Rural Development, and the ‘Dutch disease’ in Angola
The World Bank’s recent Country Economic Memorandum highlights the dangers to agriculture
and rural livelihoods in a major oil-producing country such as Angola. While improved
transportation links often benefit farmers by reducing their input costs and enhancing their access
to urban markets, in Angola’s case these benefits will be more-than-offset by the competition
from cheap imports. Oil revenues have boosted Angola’s exchange rate, making imports cheaper
in local-currency terms and making many Angolan products uncompetitive in export markets (this
is termed the ‘Dutch disease’).
The typical overvaluation of the currency in real terms observed in oil-rich countries can be a
major disaster for the agricultural sector. In Angola, for example, every farmer wishing to produce
maize for the coastal urban market has been effectively taxed by the real appreciation of the
Kwanza, especially over the past 2 years. Casual evidence indicates that they may not be
competitive with imports at current exchange rates, but that they enjoy some de facto protection
in the interior due to the extremely poor roads. It is thus clear that once the logistical
infrastructure is rehabilitated, the rural farm production will have to compete with cheap imported
goods and tradable commodities, such as cereals. In this case, a possible way to prevent
widespread depression in the agricultural sector is by rapidly increasing its competitiveness…The
key question, however, is whether productivity gains can be large enough to offset the
disadvantages posed by the strong currency… (p. 97)
The Bank points out that there is significant potential for increasing agricultural productivity as
Angola has large areas of fertile land with adequate rainfall.* But significant investment is needed
now before farming households are driven into destitution and retreat into subsistence
agriculture. Unfortunately, the GOA has budgeted little for agriculture** and, even worse, the
Ministry of Finance has not released all the budgeted amounts to the Ministry of Agriculture, so
salaries consume almost all the funds that are made available.
* At independence, Angola was self-sufficient in food production, the largest staple food exporter in subSaharan Africa and one of the world’s biggest coffee exporters. (AfDB/OECD, 2007, p. 5)
** In 2004, just 0.64% of the national budget and less than 2% of the Public Investment Programme. (p. 98)

THE MINE ACTION PROGRAMME
Angola has one of the largest mine action programmes in Africa, which started during the quasipeace following the 1994 Lusaka Peace Accords. As in most other mine-affected countries, the
bulk of funding has gone to demining, mostly conducted by international NGOs.43 In 1995, the
Government, assisted by the UNDP, made an initial attempt to establish an integrated Mine
Action Centre and operator (the Instituto Angolano de Remoção de Obstáculos e Engenhos
Explosivos – INAROEE), but this was never effective. Accordingly, the Government created the
Inter-sectoral Commission on Demining and Humanitarian Assistance (CNIDAH) in 2001 to
serve as the National Mine Action Authority and Mine Action Centre. CNIDAH has developed
some capacities (including the establishment of provincial sub-offices), it remains weak in the
important QA/QC function.
Currently, there are two almost distinct demining programmes in Angola. The INGOs work
mainly in rural areas on route opening and clearance of areas that pose dangers to lives and
livelihoods. Increasingly, the INGOs coordinate effectively with provincial governments and
CNIDAH sub-offices. Meanwhile, the Government has focused its mine action funding on its
43

HALO Trust, NPA, MAG, MgM, and DCA are operating currently, while Santa Barbara Foundation and
INTERSOS had demining operations in the past. In addition, the firm Mechem conducted large route-verification
operations in support of UN peacekeeping and humanitarian operations following the Lusaka Peace Accord.
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huge infrastructure reconstruction programme – demining support to that programme is provided
by local commercial firms plus three national operators44 working under the coordination of the
Comissao Executiva de Desminagem (CED).
Funding for mine action from both international donors and the Government has been increasing
since the end of the war.45 However, coordination both among donors and between donors and
the Government remains weak. In 2005, 6.9 km2 of land was cleared of mines and 16.9 km2 was
released via area reduction. At this rate, clearance of known minefields would take 30-50 years,
but the Government believes that its planned investments in national capacity46 will allow
clearance of all high- and medium-priority sites in 6-8 years.

EC SUPPORT FOR MINE ACTION
The EC has been the principal donor to mine action in Angola,47 contributing over EUR 47
million from 2002-0748 for (in order of size) demining by INGOs; demining in support of
infrastructure rehabilitation; capacity development support to CNIDAH (via UNDP); the LIS;
stockpile destruction; and victim assistance. Broadly, EC support to mine action has followed the
EU policy on Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD – see textbox). This seems
the appropriate strategy and a transition has been made from funding emergency operations to
support for rehabilitation. The EC and the INGOs it has been funding are still struggling with
how best to link mine action and development. The plans and monitoring and evaluation (M & E)
frameworks for demining projects still do not incorporate clear development objectives and
indicators to ensure the projects can be assessed in terms of developmental outcomes.
Textbox 4 – The EU Policy on Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD)
The concept of LRRD originates from the 1980s in response to concerns about the “grey zone”
between humanitarian assistance, rehabilitation, and development. The instruments and working
methods used in these different types of assistance programmes differ in time frames,
implementing partners, the role of national authorities, and the content of interventions.
In 1996, the EC developed a basic rationale for LRRD.* It was acknowledged that short-term
relief mechanisms do not and, in some cases, cannot systematically take into account long-term
development issues. At the same time, development policy should better assist countries to deal
with natural disasters, conflicts and other crises. These deficiencies could be reduced if relief and
development were appropriately linked, which is not simply a matter of ensuring a smooth
transition from emergency to development assistance; rather, it includes disaster preparedness
and preventing/resolving conflicts.
There is no unique model for LRRD. Broad recommendations include: improved donor
coordination; adjustment of the EU’s own instruments, working methods and internal
mechanisms; avoiding parallel structures for relief and development in a country; and clarifying
who is responsible for what.
Demining is mentioned in various contexts in the LRRD documents,** which stress the need to
44

The Instituto Nacional de Desminagem (INAD), established in 2003 from the remains of INAROEE; the Angolan
Army (FAA) and the Gabinete de Reconstrução Nacional (GRN).
45
Donors contributed $21 million in 2003, $28 million in 2004, and over $35 million in 2005.
46
The Government has announced plans to train and equip 43 demining brigades (about 3,000 personnel) in FAA,
GRN, and INAD and to develop a significant mechanical clearance capacity.
47
Other major donors are Japan, U.S.A., Norway, U.K., the Netherlands, Finland, and Germany.
48
The EC Delegation stated total contributions of about EUR 60 million since 2003.
EVALUATION OF EC-FUNDED MINE ACTION PROGRAMMES IN AFRICA
29.02.2008 | 16

integrate mine action into post-conflict planning and the wider development context.
In theory, LRRD can be promoted within EC Country Strategy Papers (CSP), which analyse all
aid-relevant aspects in a country and outline a five year plan (indicative programme). The plan
includes aid provided through all EU mechanisms including the EDF, thematic budget lines,
ECHO, and the Rapid Response Mechanism (RRM).
* Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on Linking Relief,
Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD), COM (1996) 153 final of 30.04.1996. See also, Communication
from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and
Development – An assessment, COM (2001) 153 final of 23.04.2001
** In the 1996 document under a separate paragraph “The particular case of anti-personnel mines” (p. 8),
and as instrument reacting in post-conflict situations (p. 19). The 2001 document also mentions demining
under post-conflict situation needs (p. 7), and a separate paragraph on demining stresses the importance of
integrating demining within the CSPs (p. 19).

In line with the LRRD approach, the EC has provided significant funding to demining in support
of infrastructure, while coordination among the INGOs, provincial governments, and CNIDAH
sub-offices to determine local priorities has been improving. However, coordination with the
national ministries in Luanda remains inadequate and mine action organisations appear not to be
aware of the impending ‘Dutch disease’ crisis for agricultural and rural development. As such, no
one in mine action is working through the implications of, and appropriate programming
responses to the potential devastation of rural livelihoods.

KEY ISSUES
It appears that the EC should base any strategy for future support to mine action on two broad
principles:
•
•

the need to address Angola’s humanitarian and development requirements (which in
many areas will require mine action), as well as the MBT objectives,
the fact that it is – first-and-foremost – the Government’s responsibility to meet the needs
of its citizens and to address the country’s landmine problem. The new Strategic Plan for
Mine Action is an improvement on earlier plans, but it is for the GOA to take the lead on
implementing this strategy and meeting the targets, with donors playing a supporting
role.

While continued support for mine action is warranted, the EC Delegation should now formulate
more thorough plans for its future support to mine action in Angola – a task which is complicated
by the absence of adequate strategic mine action plan (from the government) or capacity
development strategy (from the government or the UNDP).
There remain serious questions concerning the Government’s commitment to capacity
development so it can assume responsibility for Angola’s landmine problem. In particular, there
appears to be a reluctance to acknowledge performance shortcomings and to discuss realistic
ways of overcoming these. However, many observers believe that CNIDAH’s performance has
improved in some areas and that some of its staff are both capable and committed. It may be
feasible to work with these individuals and focus more tightly on the most essential capacities
(e.g. information management and QA/QC), while recognising that strengthening CNIDAH
overall will require greater senior-level commitment than currently exists.
While there remain concerns whether there is adequate commitment in Luanda to build the
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appropriate capacity for the national mine action programme, there might also be a credible
option at the province level where Vice Governors appear to be engaged, reasonably wellinformed, and not overly confident about their capacities. As a result, coordination is better at the
provincial level, with a move toward provincial mine action plans generated in cooperation with
the international mine action organisations. Over time, the provincial governments might voice
demands for increased government attention to the development priorities of the interior,
including mine action and, more generally, rural development.
The two points mentioned above suggest the possibility of using possible entry points for
effective mine action more aggressively.
UNDERSTANDING AND MONITORING DEVELOPMENTAL OUTCOMES

Now that Angola has emerged from its emergency, it is important that mine action is more tightly
aligned with development priorities at the national, provincial, and local levels. This is
happening, but it remains impossible to assess how much mine action is contributing to
development because the INGOs and other mine action actors have not yet devised systems of
reporting progress and achievements based on meaningful measures of outcomes (e.g. changes in
the well-being of people in mine-affected communities, plus growing national capacities) rather
than simply outputs.
MORE COMPLEX STRATEGY AND PROGRAMMING ISSUES

The danger of rural impoverishment has important implications for Angola’s mine action
programme. The Government is focussing its mine action contributions on demining support by
Angolan operators (both public and private) to the infrastructure programme. Meanwhile, donors
continue to finance international demining NGOs to work in rural areas, both to open secondary
roads and to clear contaminated areas that pose a danger to rural lives and livelihoods. This
demining work is facilitating the economic integration of the interior, which opens new potential
markets but also exposes agricultural producers to competition from imports. With the exchange
rate bolstered by massive natural resource revenues, rural producers will not be able to compete
with imports without significant increases in agricultural productivity. But the government has
not been investing in agriculture. On the current trajectory, therefore, demining is hastening the
influx of imports that could destroy the livelihoods of the rural people the demining agencies are
trying to assist.

SOMALIA
CONTEXT
GENERAL

In the Cold War geopolitical environment of the 1970s, Somalia’s President, Siad Barre, built
sub-Saharan Africa’s largest army and invaded Ethiopia’s Ogaden region, initiating one of the
continent’s major post-colonial wars. Somalia has suffered from internal conflict for most of the
subsequent period. Prolonged civil war led to the overthrow of Barre regime in 1991. Since then,
Somalia has lacked a central government49 and, for long periods, anarchy has reigned in South
Central Somalia. At the same time, Somaliland has achieved de facto independence and a
significant degree of stability, while Puntland has established an autonomous administration that
is able to discharge at least some state functions.
49

The international community recognises the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), formed following the adoption
of a constitutional framework for a five-year transition based on federal principles – the Transitional Federal Charter of
the Somali Republic – by the Somali National Reconciliation Conference in January 2004.
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Within the past year, Ethiopia’s army (backing the Transitional Federal Government – TFG)
overthrew the Islamic Courts Union in heavy fighting, intermittent conflict has raged in
Mogadishu (mainly between Ethiopian forces and local clan militias), and there have been
repeated conflicts between Somaliland and Puntland over the disputed regions of Sool, Sanaag,
and the south-western Togdheer.
The Ogaden War and the extended period of internal conflicts led to extensive landmine and
other ERW contamination. While minefields in Somalia are less extensive than those in some
other post-conflict African countries such Angola, Ethiopia, and Mozambique, border minefields
appear to have a significant impact in some areas, and all parts of the country suffer from
widespread ERW contamination. Continuing conflicts (including, in all probability, the laying of
new minefields) plus population movements mean that the contamination problem has a serious
impact. On a per capita basis, Somalia appears to be the most seriously impacted country in
Africa.

Annual victims/million population

Figure 9 – Estimated annual victims per million (high and low estimates)
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THE MINE ACTION PROGRAMME
Mine action began in Somaliland during 1991-93 with clearance by the company Rimfire. After a
five-year hiatus, the current mine action programme began in 1998 (again in Somaliland), with
the beginning of a UNDP mine action programme, followed by the arrival of three international
mine action NGOs – the Danish Demining Group (DDG), the HALO Trust, and St. Barbara
Foundation – all operating in Somaliland. St. Barbara Foundation has since departed while DDG
has shifted its focus from demining to broader weapons contamination programmes (EOD and,
more recently, small arms light weapons – SALW), leaving HALO Trust as the only demining
operator. In addition, Handicap International has worked with other mine action organisations in
Somaliland to provide Mine Risk Education (MRE), and a smattering of international
organisations and their local partners provide some assistance to disabled people, including
landmine survivors.
The UNDP mine action programme has been a component of the Rule of Law and Security
(ROLS) Programme (see textbox). UNDP has focused principally on the establishment of mine
action centres in both Somaliland and Puntland, and the development of explosive ordnance
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disposal capacities within the police forces in all parts of Somalia.50 However, UNDP mine action
plans have, for many years, advocated the development of local demining capacities within
Somali militaries. It is questionable whether this is an appropriate approach for a country in
conflict. Further, these UNDP plans appear to be based on a serious misconception that the
‘military model’ for humanitarian demining has been successful in many other countries.51
Textbox 5 – The UNDP Rule of Law and Security (ROLS) Programme
ROLS is an ambitious programme with the following components:
• Judiciary,
• Law Enforcement (basically, strengthening police services),
• Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR), coupled with Small Arms
Control,
• Mine Action, and
• Gender and Human Rights.
ROLS evolved from the Somali Civil Protection Programme (SCPP) which started in 1997 with
funding mainly from Italy. SCPP was managed by UNOPS but, due to “serious management
and efficiency problems”, UNDP redesigned it as ROLS for direct execution, which started in
2002 (DfID, 2005). Mine Action is the only component still managed by UNOPS. Funding has
come from Canada, DFID, the EC, Germany, Norway, Sweden, UNDP/BCPR, and USAID.
ROLS covers all regions of Somalia, but in practice most activities and expenditures have been
in Somaliland and, to a lesser extent, Puntland.
Assessments of ROLS were conducted by DfID (in December 2004) and the EC (January
2006). Both missions were broadly positive and recommended continued donor support.
Unfortunately, neither assessment mission examined the mine action component because
the relevant DfID and EC funds did not cover mine action. In turn, this seems due to UNDP
mobilising resources for mine action separately from the other ROLS components, perhaps
because mine action is executed by UNOPS rather than by UNDP directly.
Further, the evaluation team had the distinct impression that this bifurcated approach to
resource mobilisation is a serious problem for the mine action component. Recent documents
on ROLS issued by UNDP Somalia have often failed to include any budget allocation for the
mine action component.* As well, the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP)
documents** make scant mention of the need for mine action, with the RDF Report for
Somaliland lacking anything at all on mine action. Finally, the draft UNDP Country Strategy
Paper dropped any mention of mine action (although some key donors asked for it to be
included during consultation meetings the week of 17 April 2007).
This suggests that UNDP and ROLS management view mine action as something apart from
the directly executed components of ROLS, which may be why comparatively little has been
done to capitalise on the clear synergies between mine action and other security system
components (law enforcement; DDR; SALW).***
* For example, UNDP Somalia (2006), Rule of Law and Security Programme (ROLS): Programme Strategy
Phase II 2006-2008, June 2006
50

Security conditions have prevented the EOD team in South Central from resuming operations.
For example, there are repeated references to the Yemen model as a successful example of using the military as the
national demining capacity. In fact, Yemen’s mine action agency (YEMAC) is a civilian agency using demobilised
military personnel who have been retrained to demine to international mine action standards. The civilian YEMAC has
been extremely successful, while the military model was a failure. YEMAC has been supported for many years by
UNDP, so these facts should be common knowledge among the UNDP mine action personnel.
51
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** The RDP incorporates four main volumes (the overall RDP plus one volume each for Somaliland,
Puntland, and South Central) based on the Joint Needs Assessment (JNA) reports for six priority clusters
and three cross-cutting issues. All are available from:
http://www.somali-jna.org/index.cfm?Module=ActiveWeb&Page=WebPage&s=home
*** This may also reflect a tendency on the part of previous CTAs for Mine Action to see their role as a
traditional technical advisor rather than as a project manager.

OVERALL DEVELOPMENT PRIORITIES
Following the adoption of the Transitional Federal Charter in January 2004, a donor conference
in Stockholm (October 2004) agreed a draft Declaration of Principles to guide assistance from the
donor community. This called for a short-term Rapid Assistance Programme (RAP) to address
immediate needs plus the preparation of a longer term Reconstruction and Development
Programme (RDP). The following year, the UN and World Bank initiated the Joint Needs
Assessment (JNA) to provide the basis for the RDP (see textbox).
Textbox 6 – Preparing the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP)
In late 2005-2006, the UN Development Group (UNDG) and World Bank mobilised a technical
needs assessment team to conduct a post-conflict Joint Needs Assessment (JNA) of South
Central Somalia, Puntland, and Somaliland. Working under the guidance of the Coordination
Support Group,* the team produced six ‘cluster reports’ covering:
•
•
•
•
•
•

Governance, Security and the Rule of Law (including extensive material on mine action)
Macro-economic policy and data development
Infrastructure
Social services and protection of vulnerable groups
Productive sectors and the environment
Livelihoods and solutions for the displaced

From this, the UN and World Bank teams for Somalia produced a Reconstruction and
Development Programme (RDP, in four volumes covering Somalia as a whole, South Central,
Puntland, and Somaliland), structured along three ‘pillars’:
1. Deepening peace, improving security and establishing good governance
2. Strengthening essential basic services and social protection
3. Creating an enabling environment for private sector-led growth
The RDP now serves as the principal framework for international assistance to Somalia. For
example, the draft UNDP Country Assistance Strategy is derived from the RDP, and the World
Bank has just adopted an Interim Support Strategy based on the RDP. As well, the EC Somalia
Strategy for EDF 10 follows the three RDP pillars.
* Comprising the key supporting donors (EC as chair, Italy, Norway, Sweden and the UK); the Transitional
Federal Government (TFG), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the International
Finance Corporation, the NGO Consortium, and the UN and WB.

The RDP is a five-year, $2.25 billion programme of sequenced activities agreed with Somali
authorities (TFG, plus Puntland and Somaliland),52 which is intended to provide a framework for
donors to design their own assistance programmes. As a durable peace is far from certain, it
remains unclear whether the increases in assistance envisaged by the RDP will be feasible, so key
52

As in the past, there is provision for ‘asymmetric engagement’ in recognition that security and absorptive capacities
vary widely across Somali regions.
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agencies are also revising their short- and medium-term plans. For example, the UN country team
has determined its short-term focus will include “strengthening the national police
force…disarmament, demobilization and reintegration” (Report of the Secretary General, 20
April 2007, p. 10) – core elements of the UNDP ROLS programme but, apparently, not including
mine action. The UN country team has also prepared a Transition Plan for 2008-2009, with one
of the core areas being “contributing to better public security and access to justice to replace
impunity and mistrust in institutions.” (ibid, p. 11) Again, it is unclear whether this embraces
mine action.

EC SUPPORT FOR MINE ACTION
It appears that total mine action funding for Somalia has been reasonably steady at about $4+
million since 2001. The bulk of this funding has been delivered via international NGOs, with all
the remainder channelled via the UNDP. Perhaps 90% or more of total funding has been
expended in Somaliland.
Since 2002, the bulk of EC funding for mine action has been provided via the dedicated budget
line for mine action, managed in Brussels. This funded two project agreements totalling
approximately € 3.3 million (about $3.95 million).53 This represents about 16% of total donor
funding for Somalia over that period. Both grants were awarded to UNDP for support to (i) the
LIS (Phases 2 and 3 respectively) and (ii) capacity development (of the regional MACs, Police
EOD teams, plus mine action policy development).
While the current strategy and programming document does not preclude funds for mine action, it
is clear that the EC Delegation for Somalia does not believe it should be providing such support.
It does not see landmines and ERW as priority requirements for the country and, in line with the
principles of the Paris Declaration54 and with guidelines for working with fragile states, the
Delegation is trying to focus the EC programme more strategically on a limited number of
sectors, as follows:
•
•
•

governance (including the links to security)
education (consistent with the EU Consensus and EU Strategy for Africa), and
livelihoods.

KEY ISSUES
The explosives contamination problem in Somalia appears to have been misdiagnosed and
undersold by the initial UNDP mine action team. This means that donors, including the EC
Delegation, are forced to make decisions with an inadequate frame with which to assess needs
and potential benefits.
The initial UNDP team formulated an inappropriate vision for capacity development. The
underlying concept is for the militaries to provide local demining capacity. This was based on a
lack of understanding about how successful demining programmes in countries such as Yemen
are organised, and is extremely inapt in a country where the local militaries are still engaged in
53

The first (€ 1.5 million) was from funds available in 2002 (but not awarded until 2003), while the second (€ 1.8
million) was from funds available in 2004, but not awarded until 2006.
54
Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness: Ownership, Harmonisation, Alignment, Results, and Mutual Accountability,
2005.
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conflicts. As well, the MACs in both Somaliland and Puntland are viewed as UN units by local
officials.
UNDP plans for the ROLS programme give little consideration of potential synergies among
mine action and SALW, DDR, reform of police services, etc. More broadly, the potential
contributions of mine action to other pillars of international support to Somalia remain
unrecognised. By clearing pastureland and traditional migration routes, mine clearance enhances
livelihoods and reduces vulnerability for pastoralists. All aspects of mine action can also be
viewed as simply public services, the effective delivery of which restores public confidence in the
state and its organs.

SUDAN
CONTEXT
Sudan is Africa’s largest country (twice the size of Angola). With an estimated population of 37
million, large areas are sparsely populated, including the South which has suffered from conflict
for all but 10 years since independence in 1956, resulting in serious neglect, lack of infrastructure
development, and extensive destruction. During these conflicts, more than 2 million people died,
and over 4 million were internally displaced or become refugees.
Major conflicts include the two prolonged civil wars (1955-72, then 1983-2005) between the
North and the South. However, other conflicts exist, principally in Darfur (which at times has
spread into Chad55),56 while rebel groups from other countries have had bases in Sudan for long
periods (e.g. the Lord’s Resistance Army).
While language, religious, and ethnic differences underlie the various internal conflicts, the
discovery of oil has become a complicating factor, as some of the principal reserves lie in
disputed areas. As well, oil has brought higher government revenues and heavy foreign
investment (particularly from China), which means the international community has less leverage
on the Government and UN Security Council members are less likely to agree on decisive actions
in response to intransigence on the Government’s part in negotiating or adhering to peace
agreements with opposition groups.
The second North-South civil war ended with the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in
early 2005, which established a power-sharing government57 in Khartoum to rule the country for
six years. It also granted autonomy for South Sudan until 2011, at which time an independence
referendum will be held. The CPA included specific regulations for the oil-rich “Three
Transitional Areas”,58 where the final North-South boundary has not yet been agreed.
Following the signing of the CPA, the international community established the United Nations
Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), with the adoption of Security Council Resolution 1590. UNMIS has
a seven year mandate to see through the implementation of the result of the national unity
referendum. UNMIS operations follow three pillars, to:
55

Chad declared war on Sudan in December 2005 because of Sudanese support for the Rally for Democracy and
Liberty rebel movement.
56
Another insurgency ended in the east when the Government and the Eastern Front movement signed a power-sharing
agreement in October 2006.
57
The Government of National Union (GoNU).
58
The Southern Kordofan (Nuba Mountains) and Blue Nile states, plus the Abyei area
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1. Make peace sustainable;
2. Guarantee human rights of all the people of Sudan;
3. Reduce poverty and the high levels of economic inequality.
Mission tasks include support for the implementation of the Ceasefire Agreement and the
investigation of violations; donor liaison; assistance to DDR programmes and police services
reform; rule of law and human rights; facilitating the return of refugees and IDPs; and
humanitarian assistance (in part, by helping to establish the necessary security conditions).
Within the mandate, UNMIS should also assist the parties to the CPA in cooperation with other
international partners in the mine action sector, by providing humanitarian demining assistance,
technical advice, and coordination.59
A Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) is mandated to coordinate all UN
activities in Sudan. The Mission has a force protection mandate to protect UN personnel and
ensure their freedom of movement. The Military component of the Mission is headed by the
Force Commander, who is responsible for monitoring the ceasefire and force protection.
Contamination stems from multiple conflicts from World War II onwards, but the major
problems are the result of the Second North-South civil war (1983-2005). This was a guerrilla
conflict in which the Government used anti-personnel landmines to protect its garrison towns and
to interdict the SPLA,60 while the SPLA used landmines to block government forces in the towns
and to interdict their supply lines by planting anti-vehicle mines on roads.61 As a result, 21 of the
26 states in Sudan are believed to have an explosives contamination problem, with contamination
heaviest in the South and the “Three Areas” , where contaminated areas include agricultural land,
grazing land, access routes and connection roads between major towns and villages, plus bridges,
and major transport routes to Uganda, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and Kenya. In
addition, the contamination affected the delivery of food aid and other humanitarian assistance
and has delayed the return of displaced persons and refugees.
While surveying has not been completed, at the time of the country mission the UN Mine Action
Office (UNMAO) had registered dangerous areas (DAs) in seven regions (18 states, as some
regions such as Darfur and Kordofan have more than one state). A total of 1,905 Dangerous
Areas (DAs) have been recorded of which over 737 have been cleared or verified as safe. About
4,000 mine victims have been recorded, but the number of new casualties has been under 100 per
year since 2004.
Broadly speaking, landmines and other ERW create a problem in Sudan –mainly in the South and
the Three Areas – by hindering refugee return, the delivery of emergency aid, and development
efforts. Often it is not a large number of explosives, but the suspected contamination – mainly on
roads – has been the principal problem. Still, the perceived threat remains a problem as it inhibits
use of infrastructure and other socio-economic assets.

THE MINE ACTION PROGRAMME
Mine action has played an important role in the achievement of a cease fire and, ultimately, the
59

Sudan Unified Mission Plan, page 7, www.sudanig.org
The armed wing of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM).
61
Landmines were also used to terrorize local populations to diminish support for the opposition. Further, Human
Rights Watch also reported that the GOS has used landmines in its efforts to control the oil fields in southern Sudan.
60

EVALUATION OF EC-FUNDED MINE ACTION PROGRAMMES IN AFRICA
29.02.2008 | 24

peace agreement. The 2002 Nuba Mountains Cease Fire Agreement between GOS and SPLM/A
established the international Joint Military Commission (JMC) to monitor the ceasefire and
created an opportunity for safe mine action in Southern Kordofan. In the same year, a
Memorandum of Understanding was signed between the GOS, SPLM, and UNMAS. The ensuing
concept plan for Emergency Mine Action in Sudan established national and regional coordination
mechanisms in Khartoum, the Nuba Mountains and Rumbek.
The first mine clearance projects were also launched as peace-building initiatives.62 Deminers
were trained from both north and south to work in the same organisation. Both GOS and
SPLM/A showed further commitment to a mine action programme by accepting the obligations
of the APMBC. SPLM signed the Geneva Call Deed of Commitment in October 2001. GOS
ratified the Convention in October 2003 and it entered into force on 1 April 2004.
Chapter VI of the CPA states that UNMIS will assist the Parties’ demining efforts by providing
technical advice and coordination. (This is also reflected in UN Security Council Regulation
1590, which established UNMIS.) According to the UNMIS Unified Mission Plan, UNMAS is
the coordinator of a common UN mine action programme, focussing on three components:
1. Development of a mine action programme, surveying of potentially contaminated area,
clearance of priority areas, victim rehabilitation and mine risk education.
2. Clearance of priority roads to facilitate the deployment of the military and civilian police
components of the Mission. This includes Juba airport and UNMIS and other UN
deployment sites.
3. National capacity building through support to the national mine action authorities and
national NGOs in both the North and the South. This includes the development of
national technical standards.
The Mission Plan further proposes the development of a country-wide mine action strategy for
the United Nations and its partners to:
1. Support the GoNU and the GoSS in their development of national capacity to carry out
their mine action programme;
2. Oversee the work of UNMAS and UNDP, as well as other UN mine actors;63
3. Assist in creating a safe and secure environment for humanitarian and development
activities, and the deployment of UNMIS. (Sudan Unified Mission Plan, p. 32)
UNMAS, in collaboration with UNOPS, has established a UN Mine Action Office (UNMAO) in
Khartoum, with regional offices in Juba (controlling sub-offices in Wau, Rumbek, Malakal and
Yei), Kadugli (controllling sub-offices in Damazin and Kassala), and Darfur (controlling the suboffice in Al Fashir). This decentralised structure is expensive and requires many international
personnel, but it serves the needs of a large country with little infrastructure.

62

The NGOs Danish Church Aid (DCA) and Landmine Action U.K. (LA) started operations in the Nuba mountains.
LA had taken over from Oxfam, was EC-funded and worked with SLIRI. DCA had the national NGO partners
JASMAR from the north and OSIL from the south. The idea behind this was capacity building, but subsequently the
arrangements created command and control difficulties.
63
The UN Interagency Policy and Strategy specifies roles for a number of UN agencies such as UNDP (capacity
building), UNICEF (MRE), WFP (mine action in support of emergency assistance/food delivery), UNHCR (mine
action in support of repatriation of refugees).
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The CPA specifies the establishment of two national demining authorities (Northern and
Southern). These should coordinate their activities in close cooperation with UNMAO. In the
North, the National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) was established 24 December 2005 through
Presidential Decree No. 299 and officially launched on 07 March 2006. It is based in the same
building as the UNMAO, and reports to the government’s Humanitarian Aid Commission
(HAC), which in turn reports to an inter-ministerial commission under the lead of the Ministry of
Humanitarian Affairs.
In the South, the New Sudan Mine Action Directorate (NSMAD) was formally established in
Juba64 in 2005. It is also collocated with the UNMAO Regional Office. NSMAD was established
in name only with little capacity to conduct coordination activities, liaison, or mine action
planning. In August 2005, the Deputy Director of the NSMAD was removed from his duties by
the SPLM/A without explanation. In 2006, NSMAD was re-named to South Sudan Demining
Commission (SSDC), headed by the same Director, who wants to establish sub-offices
throughout the regions for direct operational control over the Joint Integrated Demining Units
(JIDU) of the national army. As well, in 2006, the Transport and Demining Steering Committee
was established in Southern Sudan to agree mine action priorities. It is chaired by the Office of
the Humanitarian Coordinator and is said to work well.
UNMAO oversees the work of commercial contractors65 and coordinates with the demining
assets of the Troop Contributing Countries and the international NGOs that receive direct funding
from donors. In addition, the WFP issues contracts for survey and road clearance.66 Coordination
between WFP and UNMAO has generally been sound, and priorities for road work are relatively
clear as the criteria are (i) opening access to Uganda and Kenya and (ii) supporting IDP and
refugee return through major regional areas and then to smaller communities.
A National Mine Action Policy and a Strategic Framework have been developed. They list a
variety of measures required to both (i) address the current needs in Sudan and (ii) support the
development of national capacities to assume greater ownership over time and, eventually, to deal
with the residual contamination. However, these frameworks do not provide a clear picture of:
the likely capabilities that will be required to address the residual contamination after the
UNMIS mandate, and
• the ways, means, and timings for transferring responsibilities progressively from
UNMAO to national organs.
Without these, a proper implementation plan for capacity development support cannot be
formulated.
•

EC SUPPORT FOR MINE ACTION
Since the signing of the CPA, the EC has contracted approximately EUR 700 million for Sudan.
The EC response strategy focussed on two issues – Food Security and Education. Additionally,
support was provided for the resettlement of IDPs and for capacity building to improve
governance. Mine clearance is specifically mentioned in the context of DDR.
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Having been relocated from Nairobi where it had been since its formation in 2002.
Firms and NGOs, which are formally contracted by UNOPS.
66
In the build-up to the CPA, WFP began road repair/reconstruction to reduce costs – since 2002/3 WFP has reduced
the percentage of airlifted food from 80% to less than 7%.
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Although it is difficult to compile a comprehensive accounting of EC-funding for Mine Action in
Sudan, it appears that, since 2001, the EC has funded 16 projects totalling approximately EUR
12.5 million. Over half of this came via the dedicated budget line for mine action (APL budget
line). The EDF Humanitarian Plus Programmes (HPP 1 & 2) funded 4 projects, and others were
funded by ECHO (3 projects) and the Rapid Response Mechanism (1 project). As well, the
Community Based Relief and Rehabilitation Programme (RRP), with EUR 50 million in
STABEX funding at its disposal, has granted EUR 10.7 million to two NGO consortia for
projects that incorporate mine action.
The bulk of EC-funding for mine action has been directed to the Three Areas (primarily Southern
Kordovan – Nuba Mountains), with support going also to the South and Eastern regions once
programming became possible in these areas in 2005 and 2006 respectively. Much of the EC
assistance has been provided to three international NGOs (in sequence, Oxfam, LMA, HALO
Trust) which sought to work with SLIRI and its associated local NGOs. At present, the EC is
funding projects implemented by MAG.
KEY ISSUES
There are two different systems in one country. A main concern is the unstable political situation
making any future planning difficult. This refers not just to the North-South conflict, but also to
Darfur and the East.
There is sufficient funding for mine action through the UN Mission.67 At the same time, the
resources available to Sudan’s governments are growing rapidly and they should be able to
provide significant funding for mine action. In this context, the EC is a small donor for mine
action. Also, within the EC country programme, mine action is a secondary issue. This leaves
little influence and policy options for EC mine action in Sudan. Consequently, there is no EC
strategy for mine action in Sudan, and funding depends on the engagement of the responsible
officer. There has been no monitoring and evaluation regime.
Overall, clearance is going ahead well in Sudan, and MRE and victim assistance programmes are
also being established. The weak point remains national institutional and operational capacity.
Therefore, a multi-year strategy and plan for capacity development is required, including steps
for progressive handover of functions (including resource mobilisation and alignment of mine
action with development plans at the national, regional, and state levels).
Mine action support needs to be provided to development agencies working in contaminated
areas that are beyond the current focus of the UNMAO. The consortium approach appeared to be
a suitable solution.
Most fundamentally, the EC Delegation should agree on whether to focus on either or both of the
following broad goals:
• capacity development for the national programme;
• the delivery of mine action services in support of community and area development
programmes in rural areas.
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This means however that the bulk of funding is used to support the needs of the UN mission.
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REGIONAL OR MULTI-COUNTRY INITIATIVES68
CONTEXT
Conventional wars between sub-Saharan African states have been relatively rare, but many of
Africa’s wars of independence and internal conflicts have had a regional dimension. For a few of
many examples:
•

•

•

•

Following its Unilateral Declaration of Independence, the Ian Smith government in Southern
Rhodesia fostered the RENAMO movement in Mozambique, leading to a protracted civil war
and – after the creation of Zimbabwe – the involvement of the apartheid regime in South
Africa. Rhodesian forces also made frequent incursions into neighbouring ‘front-line states’
to attack or interdict forces fighting for independence;
The apartheid regime in South Africa also made frequent incursions into the frontline states
to attack forces of the African National Congress and – during the Cold War period –
undertook a full-scale invasion of Angola, where the government at that time was being
supported by Cuban forces.
In the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)
was invaded by forces from a number of neighbouring countries, causing continued
instability in the Great Lakes region;
The instability in Somalia is becoming a broader regional conflict, with Ethiopia intervening
on behalf of the Transitional Government and Eritrea supporting the forces of the Islamic
Courts Union.

As well, many of the on-going conflicts in Africa (e.g. the Horn; the Great Lakes) have a
distinctly regional dimension.
Past conflicts have resulted in contamination from landmines and other ERW in a large number
of countries, particularly Mozambique, Angola, and Ethiopia/Eritrea but including a number of
countries that have not been at war themselves (e.g. some of the former frontline states such as
Malawi and Zambia). Conceivably, some of these contamination problems would be best dealt
with via regional or, at least, multi-country mechanisms.

EC SUPPORT FOR MINE ACTION
Given this context, the EU has incorporated conflict prevention elements into all of its Regional
Strategies and Indicative Programmes, and has formulated newer strategies (for the Horn and
Africa-wide) with very strong peace and security components. It also created the African Peace
Facility as the Community’s major instrument for assistance to African Peace Support Operations
and the capacity of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), centred of the with the
Peace and Security Council of the AU.
However, while Peace and Security in broad terms is becoming a more pronounced element of
the EC aid programming framework in Africa, this has not resulted in much support to regional
or multi-country mine action activities. The evaluation team has only uncovered two EC mine
action initiatives in Africa involving more than one country.69 The first – support to the SADC
Landmine Programme – was initiated before the initial Mine Action Strategy and is outside the
68

In reference to EC mine action initiatives, we use “regional” to refer to agreements with formal African Regional
institutions (e.g. SADC; ECOWAS).
69
There was also a Regional Consultation held in Addis Ababa in 2006, but this
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scope of this evaluation.70 The second was the decision in May 2002 to allocate €20 million in
unspent funds from an earlier EDF tranche to assist Eritrea and Ethiopia recover from their
border war.71 The funds were to be split equally between the two countries.
For Ethiopia, the government and the EC agreed that €8 of the €10 million would go to support
mine action in the two regions most affected by the border conflict (Tigray and Afar). The grant
agreement for the mine action project was finally signed in late 2006. The timing of this grant
was very propitious, as the bulk of the financing for mine action in Ethiopia to that point had
been coming from the World Bank loan for the Emergency Rehabilitation Program,72 which was
scheduled to wrap-up at the end of 2006. It appears that the EC grant will be the principal source
of funding to Ethiopia’s mine action programme in 2007 and 2008.
KEY ISSUES
The most obvious issue is that, with but two exceptions, the EC has not supported regional or
multi-country mine action initiatives in Africa – this in spite of the fact that:
•
•

the bulk of the landmine/ERW contamination in sub-Saharan Africa stems from conflicts
that had clear regional dimensions;
many of the ongoing conflicts that are most likely to result in significant landmine/ERW
contamination are largely regional in nature.

The second issue is that neither of these two initiatives appears to have been successful from a
regional/multi-country perspective. The SADC landmine programme has not played a significant
role in either of the two major mine action programmes in Southern Africa (Angola and
Mozambique), and does not appear to be a going-concern as a regional programme. The grant to
Ethiopia is critical for that country’s mine action programme, but was originally conceived as
part of a broader cross-border peace-building effort. The other components of this cross-border
initiative have never gone forward, and the EC funding for mine action will probably be used
mainly to finance demining activities away from the border with Eritrea, as the bulk of demining
in Tigray and Afar is completed.

70
Although we have not been able to obtain the project documents, we understand this was a significant grant (€5
million?) to the SADC Secretariat, and that much of the grant was unspent.
71
Martina Fors, Mission Report, Addis Ababa, 25 Feb. 2003.
72
The mine action component of this loan was initially set at $40 million, but was subsequently reduced to $15 million
and then (following an extension of the Program), increased again to approximately $18.5 million.
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4. CONCLUSIONS
RELEVANCE73 OF EC SUPPORT TO MINE ACTION IN AFRICA
GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE
Clearly, EC support for mine action in Africa has been relevant to the objectives and priorities
set-out in the mine action Regulations and Strategies. Financing has been provided to all pillars
of mine action, with the bulk going toward demining (as is appropriate).

RELEVANCE TO AFRICAN AND SUB-REGIONAL REQUIREMENTS
Assistance to mine action is certainly relevant to both the EU Strategy for Africa74 and to the
needs of many African countries. On some measures, Africa is considered the continent most
affected by landmines, and the EC has allocated a significant proportion of its total mine action
support to it, with financial support provided to mine action programmes in 12 African countries.
Since 2002, landmine contamination has been a major humanitarian concern in certain countries
in Africa; particularly in Angola and Sudan following the peace agreements in those countries,
when landmines threatened the return of millions of refugees and IDPs and constrained the
delivery of humanitarian assistance.75 In this context, it is appropriate that more than half of all
EC assistance to mine action was spent in Angola and Sudan in the initial post-conflict years.
Note however that, in the period covered by this evaluation, no real EC support for mine action
has been provided as an explicitly regional initiative. Thus, there has been no effort to capitalise
on the potential contributions from the organs of the AU and the main regional associations.
Further, to the degree that some landmine and ERW contamination in Africa represents a regional
problem, it can be argued that a relevant response would include explicitly regional components.
There was one effort to finance a multi-country initiative (post-conflict recovery in Ethiopia and
Eritrea) that incorporated an explicit mine action component (€8 million for mine action in
Ethiopia).
RELEVANCE TO COUNTRY REQUIREMENTS
Angola

Clearly, support for mine action has been relevant to Angola’s requirements, particularly since
the end of the protracted civil war in 2002, leading to the return of millions of refugees and IDPs.
As such, mine action is mentioned in the EC Country Strategy Paper for 2002-07, which
envisaged funding from the EDF as well as the thematic budget line. Further, mine action has
been a priority not simply from a humanitarian perspective, but also for the post-conflict
73

Relevance = The extent to which the objectives of an intervention are appropriate to the requirements of the
beneficiaries, the country’s needs, global priorities, and the policies of the donor and its overseas partner. DAC, 2002,
Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results Based Management, OECD, Paris.
74
Particularly for the (i) Peace and Security, and (ii) trade and regional integration components of this strategy.
75
Landmine contamination was also a humanitarian crisis in Mozambique following its peace agreement in 1992, but
by the time covered by this evaluation, the number of landmine casualties in Mozambique was quite modest. Landmine
and ERW contamination is also a constraint in the DRC, Northern Uganda, Senegal, etc., but the scale and density of
the contamination in those countries appears to be far lower.
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reconstruction programme – particularly for roads and bridges. Thus, the Delegation’s adoption
of the LRRD approach meant that mine action has remained relevant as Angola’s priorities have
evolved. A further change in focus from relief towards reconstruction and development will be
needed in the coming years.
The Government has decided that demining contracts in support of the major reconstruction
programme will be reserved for Angolan organisations, including companies that may be owned
by senior mine action officials. This means that international support for mine action will soon
have to be justified in terms of agricultural/rural development. Unfortunately, the rural economy
may soon be undermined by systematic under-investment coupled with (i) the rise in the value of
Angola’s currency due to oil revenues and (ii) the reconstruction programme itself, which will
soon expose rural producers to competition from cheap imports.
Somalia

In our opinion, support for mine action has been relevant, because, when compared to other
African countries, the impact of landmine/ERW contamination seems severe. At the same time,
the Delegation’s view is correct that the EC aid programme should become more focussed in this
failed state environment. Given that tough choices must be made, it is hard to fault the
Delegation’s decision not to support mine action per se, particularly when the UNDP strategy for
supporting the development of national capacities appears flawed, and mine action is not tightly
linked with the broader programme to re-establish security and the rule of law in the parts of
Somalia where this is a feasible goal (Somaliland and Puntland).
Sudan

Support for mine action has been extremely relevant, even though the numbers of landmines
appears to be far fewer than was the case in conflicts such as Mozambique, Angola, and
Ethiopia/Eritrea. Mine action was used strategically as a confidence-building measure, which
advance the peace process. As a result of this early start for mine action, the UN mine action
programme has been able to establish large operations in a vast country within a reasonable
period, thus supporting the peacekeeping mission and contributing to the alleviation of the
humanitarian crisis. Mine action assets are in place to support the post-conflict reconstruction
effort, which is now expanding. International mine action NGOs are establishing operations in
more remote areas in support of community development programmes.

EFFECTIVENESS OF EC SUPPORT TO MINE ACTION
ADDRESSING THE CONTAMINATION PROBLEMS
The authors of the Global Assessment were perhaps most critical about technical and contracting
matters that would reduce the efficiency of EC aid for mine action. Our evaluation did not
attempt to assess efficiency, which would have required detailed analysis of individual projects.
Instead, we focussed on ‘effectiveness’ – a term that can mean many things.
Given this evaluation focuses on programming decisions, perhaps the best measure of
effectiveness is whether EC mine action portfolios (i) contributed substantially to the
amelioration of the most pressing or serious impacts in the transition from conflict to sustained
development and (ii) capitalised on opportunities to deliver additional benefits by promoting
broader objectives, such as peace-building, reconstruction, and development. Broadly these are:
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Stage in transition
While conflict
continues

Critical contamination problems
• mine action is only feasible in
contaminated areas that are
secure or when the warring
parties agree

Immediate postconflict period

• Clearance of roads so refugees/
IDPs can return safely, and so
humanitarian aid can be delivered
• Where a peacekeeping mission
is deployed, support for the
mission (force mobility)
• Contamination along roads and
other infrastructure networks
• Contamination that prevents the
resumption of essential public
services (e.g. schools, clinics)
• More varied and dispersed
problems, with fewer obvious
priorities

Reconstruction

Normal development

Opportunities
• initiatives that foster cooperation
between warring parties, to build
confidence and promote peace
• encouraging warring parties to
ban the use of landmines
• hiring deminers from all
factions, contributing to DDR and
peace-building in general
• support to security system
reforms in general, (e.g. building
police EOD capacities)
• Effective support to major
infrastructure projects
• Effective support to community
development/human security
programmes.
• Effective support for
development actors (sector, area,
& community development)

Generally, the programming of EC assistance within most mine-affected countries appears to
have been effective. In Sudan, the EC supported early mine action initiatives that contributed
significantly to the broader peace process. In Angola and Sudan, the amount of funding for mine
action rose dramatically in the immediate post-conflict period, when the landmine contamination
can lead to a humanitarian crisis. In recent years, the Delegation in Angola has sought to steer its
mine action partners (mainly European NGOs) to focus increasingly on support to reconstruction
and development. In Angola as well, EC assistance has supported the development of capacities
in the provinces, where many Vice Governors appear to be committed to the mine action
programme even if some officials in Luanda are not. Recently, the EC in Sudan has also added
projects in its mine action portfolio to support community development in more remote areas
which could provide greater scope for state governments to get involved in the priority-setting
process.
EC assistance has been less effective in Somalia, where it has channelled virtually all its mine
action funding via the UNDP.76 At the same time, the case of Somalia relative to other African
countries suggests that donor programming mechanisms for mine action – including those of the
EC – are not effective in allocating aid across countries in accordance to need.77

76

There are far fewer potential partners in Somalia than in Angola or Sudan.
In part this is probably due to the same reasons that humanitarian aid is not allocated in proportion to need – donor
country foreign policy interests, the lack of news media attention on some emergencies, etc. (see, for example, Smillie,
Ian and Larry Minear, 2003, The Quality of Money: Donor Behavior in Humanitarian Financing, Feinstein
International Famine Center, Tufts University). In the case of mine action, some African governments have played high
profile roles in the Ottawa Process (e.g. Mozambique), which probably led to increased donor funding.
77
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Figure 10 – Estimated funding per landmine victim78
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This shortcoming is likely to be exacerbated by the deconcentration policy and by the termination
of the AP landmines budget line. As yet, there are no EC mechanisms in place at the pan-African
or regional levels that would compensate for the difficulty in achieving appropriate allocations of
resources across mine-affected countries in Africa.
FOSTERING NATIONAL OWNERSHIP
The EC has achieved less in terms of fostering national ownership of national mine action
programmes in Africa. The EC has provided no mine action support directly to an African
government or, since 2002, via an African regional institution.79 This reflects the fact that most
African mine action programmes were initiated in failed or fragile states, where governments
may lack capacity, commitment to equitable development, or both. Accordingly, the bulk of EC
mine action funding has been channelled through international NGOs and, secondly, through the
UNDP.
UNDP mine action projects typically focus on fostering national ownership, in large part by
supporting capacity development within the national mine action organs. However, such UNDP
support appears to have been ineffective in most instances in Africa. More than a decade of
support for capacity development in Angola has not led to an effective national programme. The
Angolan government seems content to leave ‘humanitarian’ (i.e. neither military nor commercial)
mine action to international NGOs and their supporting donors, while focussing its own efforts on
demining in support of major infrastructure projects.80 UNDP has been assisting Somaliland for
nearly a decade, where the MAC and the Police EOD teams remain almost completely dependent
78

Annual averages for the two most recent years. See the report on the Somalia mission for details on data sources.
It did provide a grant to SADC for its regional landmine programme, but that was prior to the period covered by this
evaluation.
80
The same basic conclusion was reached in 2005 in the Review of Ten Years Assistance to Mine Action in
Mozambique – another country in which the EC channelled significant assistance via the UNDP for capacity
development. However, Ethiopia has developed significant capacity, in part with UNDP assistance: see GICHD, 2007,
Evaluation of NPA’s Humanitarian Mine Action Project and Review of Ethiopia’s Mine Action Programme.
79
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on continued UNDP support.81 Such assistance to Sudan has been in place for only three years,
where some progress in building national capacities has been achieved, particularly over the past
year. But it remains too early to conclude that the UNDP support for capacity development in
Sudan will lead to good outcomes.
A particular problem in Sudan is the sheer scale of the mine action programme in support of
UNMIS, coupled with the large number of international personnel in decision-making rather than
advisory roles. The domination of mine action by international organisations and managers
inhibits the growth of national ownership and capacities. This has been a recurrent problem when
large UN Peacekeeping Missions have been fielded, such as in Mozambique in the mid-1990s.
This problem was highlighted in a major 1996 UN study on developing mine action capacities,82
which led to an overhaul of UN involvement in mine action, with UNMAS designated as the lead
agency and UNDP focussing on capacity development. However, in most cases where a
Peacekeeping mission is present, UNMAS has a large programme and direct operational
responsibilities for UN mission support, and UNDP remains very much a junior partner. In Sudan
for example, the UNDP budget is perhaps only 2% of the overall UN budget for mine action.
Of course capacity development of public sector agencies in Africa is often a difficult
proposition;83 particularly in failed or fragile states. But the UNDP record to date in developing
the capacity of national organs and fostering national ownership is far from encouraging.
Conceivably, national ownership concerning mine action could also be fostered within civil
society actors. Unfortunately, international NGOs have not been very successful in developing
capable African mine action NGOs84 – particularly for demining.85
SUPPORTING RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT PRIORITIES
As noted above, the officers responsible for mine action in some of the EC Delegations have
encouraged their mine action implementing partners – and particularly the European demining
NGOs – to make the transition from relief to reconstruction. This LRRD process has gone
furthest in Angola, but it is starting in Sudan as well. However, demining in support of
reconstruction is a relatively easy transition to make: typically, combatants mine roads and other
infrastructure networks and demining of road surfaces is generally undertaken during the
humanitarian assistance phase of a mine action programme, so operators are aware of the
remaining hazards that need to be cleared once reconstruction begins. Once the reconstruction
begins in earnest, there are comparatively few major projects, so coordination and priority-setting
problems are comparatively modest.
81

Indeed, the SMAC is still regarded by many government officials as a UNDP unit – hardly a sign of growing
national ownership.
82
Eaton, Robert, C. Horwood, and N. Niland, The Development of Indigenous Mine Action Capacities, DHA, 1997:
overall report and separate country reports for Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, and Mozambique.
83
This was a major finding of the large World Bank study, Capacity Building in Africa: An OED Evaluation of World
Bank Support, 2005.
84
Interestingly, in Ethiopia and some non-African countries, NPA has focussed on supporting capacity development of
national organs (national authorities, MACs, operators) rather than local NGOs. However, a recent evaluation of NPA
programmes in Angola has recommended that NPA explore a ‘nationalisation strategy’ to, essentially, convert its mine
action programme into a national NGO. Isaksen, J., I. Samset, and F. Pacheco, 2006, Mid-term Review of the Angola
Programme of Norweigian People’s Aid, Chr. Michelsen Institute.
85
As well, the effort by UNDP in Mozambique to transform the Accelerated Demining Programme (ADP) into a local
NGO was a failure, and ADP collapsed after a decade of UNDP support. See Ten Years Assistance to Mine Action in
Mozambique.
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The transition to mine action in support of development appears to be more difficult.
Development initiatives are more widespread, involving many more actors, so coordination is a
greater challenge. Often, the major contamination problems have been cleared by the time
development picks-up pace, so demining operators often need to reorganise based on smaller,
multi-skilled mobile teams that can respond flexibly to smaller, more widespread hazards in
support of many development actors, including local authorities. Demining agencies face real
problems in defining their objectives in terms of developmental outcomes, in identifying the
correct priorities in a transparent manner, and in coordinating with a far larger number of actors.
As well, successful development requires sound policies and strategies at the macro level if
meso-level programmes and micro-level activities are to lead to sustained benefits. Mine action
practitioners are not used to considering macroeconomic policies. Again, Angola is a good
example. The current strategies and priorities of the international demining NGOs are appropriate
for opening the interior of the country and promoting rural development. However, the rise in
Angola’s exchange rate due to oil revenues means that rural producers in newly accessible areas
will soon face competition from cheap imports, which could lead to rural impoverishment and
accelerated rural-urban migration unless complementary measures are taken to raise agricultural
productivity.86
COORDINATION BETWEEN THE EC AND OTHER AGENCIES SUPPORTING
MINE ACTION
In all three countries visited by the evaluation team, coordination between donors and the
governments on mine action or on broader aid and development issues appears far from ideal. In
Somalia of course, there simply is no internationally recognised government with de facto control
over the country. Coordination in the relatively stable region is constrained because (i)
Somaliland is not recognised as an independent state and (ii) senior donor officials are mostly
based in Nairobi.
In both Angola and Sudan, such coordination is greatly hampered because the broader
relationships between the governments and the international community have been strained for
some time. In both cases, donor countries have comparatively little leverage over governments
that have access to substantial financial resources from other sources (oil revenues; loans from
China).
In such cases, UN and other multilateral agencies may facilitate coordination with the
government or among donors. In both Somalia and Sudan for example, the UN and World Bank
recently undertook joint Post-Conflict Needs Assessments (the Joint Needs Assessment [JNA] in
Somalia and the Joint Assessment Mission [JAM] in Sudan), which undoubtedly have helped
establish a broad strategic focus for donors.87
However, there does not appear to be a mechanism for facilitating coordination among all mine
action stakeholders in any of the countries visited for this evaluation. In Angola, the government
does not convene meetings with all mine action donors, and discourages meetings among the
donors themselves. For Somalia, coordination with the de facto governments is constrained as the
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While one must be realistic in terms of what mine action programmes can achieve in terms of rural development in
the face of unpropitious macro-economic developments, combined community/area development and mine action
projects (such as the Community Based RRP projects in Sudan) might be appropriate in such situations.
87
Landmine contamination and the need for mine action are featured in both the JNA and JAM.
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EC and other donors are based in Nairobi, while the UNDP does not appear to have been active
in convening meetings of the main mine action stakeholders, including donors. In Sudan,
coordination of mine action focuses primarily on the UNMAO programme. There appears to
have been little systematic dialogue between donors and the Sudanese governments concerning
the longer-term strategy and a transition to national ownership.88
In the absence of a coordination mechanism established by the government or a UN agency and,
ideally, a long-term government strategy for mine action, it will always be difficult for EC
Delegates to coordinate effectively with other agencies supporting mine action.

THE IMPACT OF DECONCENTRATION OF EC AID
As the EC Mine Action Strategy incorporated an indicative programme through 2007, the full
impact of deconcentration has not yet been felt. For the most part, the planned projects for APL
budget line funding have gone forward. Still, the nature of the impacts – both positive and
negative – are apparent.
The principal benefit of deconcentration is the empowerment of EC Delegations in terms of
programming. The Delegations are in a better position to monitor the political and economic
evolution of the country, the evolution of government priorities, and the achievements of the
projects already being implemented. This is essential information for making sound decisions on
the programme should evolve.
It appears that deconcentration of responsibility and authority has led also to empowerment in a
wider sense. Where the delegates responsible for mine action believe mine action should be a
priority in a country, they have worked hard to put a sound programme in place, often showing
some entrepreneurial flair in securing resources from a number of different EC funds (e.g.
unspent STABEX balances; the Rapid Response Mechanism).
Deconcentration should also allow for more coordination among those donors with
representatives in the country. On the other hand, the EC delivers large and often complex aid
programmes in African countries, and delegates typically must cover a number of sectors. Not all
officers assigned responsibility for mine action will be convinced that it should be a priority (at
all or for the EC) and/or comfortable in dealing with the specialised technical issues.
As well, there is the issue of institutional memory, which is particularly difficult for agencies that
decentralise authority and maintain a policy of regular staff rotation. Deconcentrated offices
typically are too small to justify teams of officers working on a sector, so when the officer
responsible for mine action moves to another post, there will be no one with significant
experience on the evolution of the country’s mine action programme and the EC assistance to that
programme. The EC Delegation in Angola has engaged a local consultant to advise on mine
action, which has worked well. However, the EC mine action portfolio in Angola is far larger
than in any other African country.
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As well, neither UNMAO nor the governments have formulated a medium-term plan for mine action, which would
be an essential requirement for coordinating multiple stakeholders who have to make decisions within at least a
medium-term time horizon.
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Deconcentration has been accompanied by the end of the APL thematic budget line and the
reduction in the staff complement dedicated to mine action at headquarters, which have had, or
can be expected to have, a number of impacts, which are discussed in the next section.

THE IMPACT OF THE END OF DEDICATED MINE ACTION FUNDING &
UNITS
As yet, the end of the dedicated funding for mine action has had little or no effect on the quantity
of assistance being provided to mine action in Africa. Indeed, most of the mine action funding in
Africa has come from the EDF, and we understand that the sums budgeted from the APL
thematic budget for 2007 were made available to the relevant EC Delegations.
There is no clear indication that the end of the dedicated funding for mine action has had an
effect on the quality of EC assistance. The Global Assessment correctly noted that EC
Delegations lack officers with the expertise to assess project proposals89 (particularly in their
technical elements) and to monitor implementation.90 However, the small units in Brussels
charged with managing the thematic budget line did not contain officers with technical expertise
in mine action, so they would not have been able to directly assist the EC Delegations in this
regard.
It may be that the end of the thematic budget line will lead to some changes in the type of mine
action projects that are funded. From our records, all of the funding for Landmine Impact Surveys
or to projects that explicitly incorporated LIS components came from the thematic budget line. It
is unclear whether this is because delegates in mine affected countries tend to put a lower priority
on the LIS,91 or because the Survey Action Center (the NGO that designed and oversees the LIS
process) focused on Brussels when raising resources for surveys.
While the end of the dedicated budget line and mine action units in Brussels may not yet have
had any significant effect on the quantity or quality of EC assistance to mine action, their absence
will almost certainly have impacts in the future. Even though the officers responsible for mine
action in Brussels lacked technical expertise, they did work full-time on mine action and would
be important points of contact and advice for officers in the EC Delegations. The Brussels-based
staff were aware of the evolving policy debates in mine action internationally, of innovations in
the field that might be useful in other countries, of lessons of experience, and so on. They also
maintained wide-ranging contacts within the mine action field and could put EC Delegations in
touch with relevant experts in the field. They could also help the Delegations in coping with the
loss of institutional memory following a transfer of a Delegate responsible for the mine action
portfolio in a country.
The reduction in the dedicated mine action section in Brussels will also have an impact over time
because there is no convenient way to implement some of the performance improvement
recommendations contained in the Global Assessment. For example, the Global Assessment
recommended outside experts be contracted for technical assessments of mine action project
89
The authors of the Global Assessment also stated that “Greater contractual rigour is needed to…[obtain]… better
value for money.”
90
For countries in which the quality assurance/control regime is weak, technical expertise may also be required for
project monitoring.
91
The LIS was an important innovation in mine action, but they have been controversial because of their expense and
because the results have rarely been used to good effect. DEMEX and Scanteam, 2003, Evaluation of the Global
Landmine Survey Process.
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proposals (pp. 15, 18). The EC Delegation in Angola, with by far the largest mine action
portfolio, has taken this step, which appears to have been an appropriate decision. But it may not
be cost-effective in financial or (perhaps more critically) delegate work-load terms to engage
outside technical experts for each project or for countries with smaller portfolios of mine action
projects. A stronger headquarters section might have arranged for this technical expertise on
behalf of the EC Delegations in all countries with relatively small mine action portfolios. There
appears to be no EC unit covering Africa or the African regions that could perform this task.
Thus, it is difficult to implement an otherwise reasonable recommendation.
More fundamentally however, the absence of the dedicated budget line seems likely to lead to a
decline in future EC support for mine action to Africa. It is clear that the truly large sums of
international funding for mine action flow to countries emerging from conflicts (e.g. Angola after
2002), when refugees and IDPs are returning and attempting to rebuild their livelihoods, and
when large amounts of humanitarian aid must flow. Even larger sums are allocated when
Peacekeepers – particularly UN Peacekeepers – are in place (e.g. Sudan after 2005).92 In a few
countries with severe and extensive contamination, continued funding for mine action is
warranted on developmental grounds to support the reconstruction of infrastructure and
community or area development efforts in the most contaminated regions.
So EC funds for mine action can be expected to continue when landmine contamination is a
humanitarian or developmental priority. But with the repeal of the mine action Regulations
(which were a ‘direct response’ to the Ottawa Convention), there is no instrument for furthering
the implementation of the Ottawa Convention per se. Even with the dedicated funding in place,
mine-affected States Parties such as Malawi and Zambia never received EC funding to assist
them in meeting their Treaty obligations. Perhaps this is reasonable on the grounds that mine
action projects which support humanitarian and developmental priorities as well as Treaty
implementation should be preferred over those justified mainly in terms of Treaty obligations
alone. However, barring future conflicts, mine action is not a humanitarian or developmental
priority in Mozambique or Ethiopia today, and will not be a priority for most of Angola or Sudan
a few years hence. It seems unlikely that EC Delegations in these countries would allocate
significant EDF funding to mine action when this is not a development priority.
How soon support for mine action will end in a country would depend, in practice, on how long
the list of development priorities is and on how successfully mine action managers link their
programmes to bone fide development priorities. The case of Somalia is instructive, where the
EC Delegation opposes funding to mine action because (i) it intends to limit EC support to three
sectors,93 and (ii) mine action managers have not done a good job in demonstrating how mine
action supports other priorities and programmes. If such a case is valid in Somalia (which we
have seen, on some measures may be the most impacted state in Africa), how long can one expect
donor funding for mine action to continue in Angola, Ethiopia, and Sudan?

92

The EC is not assessed by the UN to support UN Peacekeeping missions, but EU member states are. Through the
African Peace Facility, the EC is a significant contributor to African Peacekeeping missions, but it has not used this
instrument to finance mine action explicitly to support these missions.
93
This is in line with programming guidelines for donors operating in failed states, where aid
fragmentation/proliferation will quickly overwhelm government capacities. The specification that donors should assist
a maximum of three sectors appears to have come from the Afghan Compact.
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Finally, there are fewer human resources based in Brussels to maintain a strong EC role in
international meetings on mine action, and in liaison among donor headquarters concerning
support for mine action.94
Textbox 7 – The international dimension to mine action
Because an international treaty exists for mine action, there is a regular programme of meetings
of States Parties on Treaty implementation (the ‘Ottawa Process’), including annual Meetings of
States Parties, with one Intersessional each year, plus five-year Review Meetings. These provide
an important forum for States Parties to the Treaty to discuss policy matters including, for one
critical example, the looming issue of how to deal with requests for extension of the ten-year limit
for States Parties to clear all known minefields in their territories.
Another important event in the mine action calendar is the Annual Meeting of National
Programme Directors, which brings together officials from national mine action authorities and
centres, the UN agencies involved in mine action, specialised mine action organisations (GICHD,
Survey Action Centre, etc.), and representatives from donors. Participation at this meeting allows
people to stay abreast of the principal innovations in the field and to track the emerging agenda
for both policy and operational issues.
There are also regular meetings of the Mine Action Support Group, which brings together
representatives of the principal donors, usually with the UN agencies and specialised mine action
organisations, to discuss issues from the donor perspective.
In addition, there are moves to adopt an international instrument concerning the use of cluster
munitions, either through a new protocol to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons of
War (CCW) or as a separate treaty (an option being led by Norway through what is termed the
‘Oslo Process’). While this issue in important from the wider disarmament arena, it has important
implications for mine action, as it is mine action programmes and practitioners that deal with the
clearance of explosive remnants of war (ERW), including cluster munitions. The issue of ERW in
general is already dealt with in the 2003-adopted Protocol V of the CCW – an instrument that
foresees international assistance, as well as annual meetings of the State Parties. At present,
there is work in progress to establish a strong international implementation mechanism.
While the EC is represented in these forums by diplomats covering disarmament issues, they are
not focused purely on landmines and other ERW, and they do not work within the aid policy and
delivery directorates of the Commission – an important shortcoming as many of these
discussions have important implications for the EC aid programmes.
For the EC in particular, there is also the important issue of coordination with EU member states
concerning landmines and other ERW from both the disarmament and aid perspectives.

OTHER ISSUES
THE NEED FOR STRATEGIC PLANS FOR NATIONAL MINE ACTION
PROGRAMMES
The task of EC Delegations in programming assistance for mine action would be greatly aided if
there were feasible strategic plans formulated by national governments (with UNDP assistance
94
Previously, these roles were admirably discharged by the Conventional Disarmament & Human Security section in
RELEX. They now fall largely to the EC representative for disarmament in Geneva, as less support is available from
Brussels-based officials.
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where necessary) and endorsed by the major donors providing mine action assistance in that
country. There are no such plans in any of the countries visited for this evaluation, and reports
from other evaluations indicate that adequate plans of this type do not exist in Eritrea, Ethiopia,
or Mozambique. Therefore, this appears to be a systemic problem in mine action field.
Ideally, such plans would be developed through a process that includes all the main mine action
stakeholders in the country – government, donors, UN agencies, operators, and local civil society.
The process should be based on a common assessment of needs and lead to a common strategy
for all mine action actors, covering the entire national programme. The strategy should be clear
on what results are expected, and should incorporate indicators for monitoring progress and
maintaining mutual accountability. (In short, a programme-based approach should be adopted.)
Such a strategy would facilitate donor coordination among themselves and with the government,
and would allow donors and operators to formulate exit strategies.
In immediate post-conflict periods or in other situations where the government lacks the
commitment or capability to formulate an adequate strategy, it is normal for UN agencies to
assume some of the functions of a national mine action authority (typically, UNMAS) and to
support the government in developing its capacity (typically, UNDP) and in assuming ownership
of the national mine action programme. While some progress has been achieved in a number of
countries,95 the evaluation team has not come across a single case in Africa where UNDP support
to the national mine action organs has resulted in an adequate strategy for the national mine
action programme. As seems clear from the case of Sudan, when UNMAS is active in a country,
its priority is implementing operations in support of the UN mission, and – to date at least – it
produces short-term operational plans rather than medium-term strategic plans.96
MINE ACTION, PEACE AND SECURITY
Peace and security issues loom large in the EU Strategy for Africa and within the evolving EUAU Partnership. The African Peace Facility is a large and important instrument. Mine action is
not outside the EU’s African security agenda, but it appears not adequately incorporated as yet.
As was the case with many other donors in the aftermath of the Mine Ban Convention, the EC
approved dedicated mine action funding as the lynchpin of an expanded mine action portfolio.
This led to mine action evolving in many instances as a relatively standalone sector. Ever since,
there have been efforts to link mine action to broader programmes – principally humanitarian
assistance, post-conflict reconstruction, and development. Such efforts are certainly appropriate
for countries making the relief  reconstruction  development transition. However there are
some mine-affected countries, including a number in Africa, where insecurity is so great that it
blocks this transition. In such instances, mine action should be linked to the broader peace and
security agenda.
There are cases where mine action has made a significant contribution to peace and security. In
Sudan, the EC supported early steps to get both the government and the SPLA to agree to a ban
on the use of landmines and, eventually, agree on ‘cross-border’ mine action initiatives that
served as a confidence-building measure in the build-up to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.
95

For example, the Government of National Unity in Sudan has adopted a Mine Action Policy Framework and a Mine
Action Strategy Framework, but together these fall short of what is required for a strategic plan.
96
UNMAS is in the process of engaging a Transitions Planner for Sudan who would, presumably, develop a mediumterm plan for transferring responsibility to national authorities.
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In Somalia, the Danish Demining Group’s mine action programme has served as a platform for
SALW activities. In a number of countries, mine action programmes have made major
contributions to DDR by providing well-paid and highly respected work for former combatants.
In general, mine action has often served as the ‘point of entry’ for international engagement with
warring parties.
The incorporation of mine action into the broad Rule of Law and Security (ROLS) programme in
Somalia shows that the UNDP also recognises the potential synergies between mine action and
other security sector programmes (SALW, DDR, police reform). However, the ROLS programme
also demonstrates that the appropriate linkages among these different aspects of security system
reform do not simply happen. Within ROLS, mine action is managed as a standalone component,
sub-contracted to a different UN agency (UNOPS), and left largely to its own devices for
resource mobilisation.

MINE ACTION AND REGIONAL/SUB-REGIONAL PROGRAMMES
As noted earlier, there have been no African regional/sub-regional mine action programmes
supported by the EC during the period covered by this evaluation – there was a global
programme, and there are a number of continuing country programmes.
The absence of (sub)-regional programmes means certain types of problems created by
explosives contamination are difficult to address for the EC. The approval of parallel postconflict projects incorporating mine action for Eritrea and Ethiopia demonstrates that it is
possible for the EC to provide, if not regional, at least multi-country projects.97 However, the
there is no clear solution to address the following problems and opportunities:
•

•
•

‘forgotten’ problems of explosives contamination, where the limited scale of
contamination in a country means it is not a priority from any broader perspective
(peace-building; security system reform; reconstruction; development)
problems that are inherently sub-regional (e.g. contamination in the former frontline
states of Southern Africa)
opportunities to use mine action to promote peace-building and functional cooperation on
a sub-regional basis.

The absence of either a global programme or (sub-)regional programmes also means there is
nothing to back-up the EC Delegations in countries where there are EC-funded mine action
programmes.

97

This also illustrates the inherent risks in attempting such programmes, at least for countries that remain belligerent.
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5. RECOMMENDATIONS
Recommendation 1 – Strengthen the focal point for mine action in Brussels
While deconcentration promises to deliver many benefits for mine action and for EC country aid
programmes in general, the officers responsible for mine action in the Delegations are not
specialists in the field and typically have to cover other sectors. As well, periodic staff rotation
will make it difficult for the Delegations to retain the institutional memory required to make wellinformed programming decisions. A bolstered focal point section in Brussels would be an
important resource for the officers responsible for mine action in the Delegations, and would be
in a position to help delegates who are new to mine action get up to speed as quickly as possible.
In addition, with more resources the focal point section would be able to:
•
•
•

•
•
•
•

represent the EC in international forums, including meetings of the States Parties to the
Mine Ban Treaty
coordinate with EU member states on Treaty and other mine action issues
serve as a conduit of information to the Delegations in mine-affected states concerning
the evolution of policy debates, new operational innovations, and the emerging mine
action agenda
advise Delegations concerning mine action experts who could assist Delegations in
designing programmes, assessing proposals, evaluations, etc. (see recommendation 4)
assume responsibility for programming of a dedicated mine action fund, should this be
re-established (see recommendation 2)
assist in mine action programming financed by regional programmes (see
recommendation 3)
implement the recommendations from the Global Assessment that were contingent on the
existence of a mine action unit in Brussels.

Note that other important mine action donors (AusAid; CIDA; Sida) have decentralised the bulk
of their mine action programming responsibilities to the country programme level, but have
retained a focal point officer or unit in headquarters to provide advice on policy and practice and,
in some cases, to administer a small dedicated mine action fund retained by headquarters.
Recommendation 2 – Assess whether a thematic funding ‘window’ within existing
budget instruments can be created at headquarters level to support Treaty
implementation and global issues.
The EC Mine Action Regulations were adopted in part to support the implementation of the Mine
Ban Convention.98 This Convention has important implications for both aid and disarmament. EC
Delegations are likely to continue to support mine action in countries where landmines/ERW
represent a humanitarian emergency or an important impediment to reconstruction and
development. EC aid funds are, however, not designed to advance disarmament issues; most
obviously, how to assist modestly mine-affected poor countries which have ratified the
Convention and need to destroy stockpiles and clear all known minefields as a Treaty

98

This Regulation is a direct response to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and
Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and their Destruction, Regulation (EC) No 1724/2001, par. 6).
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obligation.99 In such countries, explosives contamination is not a development priority and (in
line with aid effectiveness principles), senior government officials and the EC Delegation may
reasonably decide not to include mine action in the country aid programme. To advance the
global disarmament agenda, the EC may still wish to provide assistance to at least those countries
that are addressing their contamination in a responsible manner, but which lack the financial
resources to complete the job.100
Recommendation 3 – Review the options for modest mine action programmes at
the regional or (sub-)regional level in Africa.
The EC has put in place a number of Regional Strategies and Indicative Programmes covering
major sub-regions in Africa, most of which have explicit provision for support to conflict
prevention, security, etc. In at least two regions (the Horn of Africa; Eastern and Southern
Africa), it may be appropriate to establish small regional mine action programmes designed to:
•
•

•

provide an expert focal point to provide strategic advice to EC Delegations, regional
institutions, and national authorities on mine action issues
fund modest initiatives to address contamination that is clearly of a multi-country or
regional nature (e.g. landmines laid by Rhodesian and South African forces in the former
front line states; border minefields between Ethiopia and Somalia; cross-border
contamination in the Great Lakes States)
provide modest funding to countries in which the EC Delegation has completed its exit
strategy for mine action (see recommendation 6)

In Southern Africa, it may be appropriate to dedicate this focal point and fund to mine action. In
the Horn of Africa (and perhaps West Africa and Central Africa), it probably would be more
appropriate to have a focal unit and fund covering security system reform issues, including
landmines/ERW.101
Similarly, the African Peace Facility has significant funds available for capacity development.
Modest amounts might be used to support the Peace and Security Council or a specialised
institute with a regional mandate in assisting AU member states with landmine/ERW
contamination issues.
The existence of regional focal points would also go some way to overcoming the inherent
problems that accompany deconcentration (lack of sector specific expertise; maintaining
institutional memory).
Recommendation 4 – Identify and perhaps pre-qualify mine action experts that
can advise Delegations on programming issues.
While the case of Angola shows that Delegations can contract-in specialists to assist with mine
action projects, the Delegations in countries with smaller mine action portfolios may have more
difficulty in identifying and contracting experts with the appropriate skills. A mine action focal
99

Malawi and Zambia are good examples from Africa. As well, more contaminated countries such as Angola and
Sudan will reach a point where the remaining contamination does not constitute a humanitarian or development
priority, but clearance still represents a Treaty obligation.
100
This would be relevant as well in connection with Article V of the CCW (covering ERW), which also addresses
international assistance.
101
These could be housed in the relevant sub-regional organs or in specialised independent institutes dealing with
peace and security issues at the sub-regional level. Where feasible, the latter option might be more effective as such
institutes could operate with an ‘effectiveness’ rather than a ‘political’ mandate.
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point in Brussels or, conceivably, at the (sub-)regional level, could assist Delegations by
maintaining a list of persons with appropriate technical expertise and regional experience.
Ideally, focal points might also manage periodic calls for proposal to pre-qualify a small list of
experts and simplify the contracting process for individual assignments.
Recommendation 5 – Delegations should request proper strategic plans from
national mine action authorities and/or the lead UN agency for mine action in each
country.
A common problem with the national mine action programmes in Africa is the lack of an
adequate strategic plan that would provide a framework for EC programming decisions and
would facilitate donor coordination (both among themselves and with the government). The lack
of such plans also greatly complicates the programming and coordination tasks of the EC
Delegations.
In failed states and the immediate post-conflict period, the lead UN agency for mine action in that
country may have to formulate such a plan (which should then cover support for capacity
development and fostering national ownership). However, the goal would be to evolve to a
country-led102 programme-based approach.
Recommendation 6 – EC Delegations should formulate exit strategies for their
support to mine action.
In the absence of new conflicts, landmine/ERW problems are finite and all support to mine action
should be based on the understanding that the support will end within a reasonable period. Exit
strategies are particularly important for mine action as demining involves the use of expensive,
often specialised equipment, and demining operators often have large numbers of local personnel
who should be given fair notice well prior to the termination or downsizing of the programme.
Ideally, an exit would not be a sudden collapse of support, but rather a staged reduction as the
national mine action programme reaches a series of graduation points (end of full-time technical
advisers; end of dedicated funding for standalone mine action; etc.).
Recommendation 7 – For countries where the EC has large mine action portfolios,
commission country-level reviews of EC-funded mine action.
The scope of a regional evaluation is, by nature, very broad. As well, because the EC does not
have regional programmes for mine action, the subjects of the exercise were a number of distinct
but concrete country programmes, coupled with a more conceptual issue – the gap existing in the
absence of a regional programme.
Time did not allow an adequate evaluation of the EC mine action portfolios in any of the three
countries visited. However, the evaluation team prepared fairly extended reports following each
of the country missions, in part because we needed to have a solid grasp of the country context
and the evolution of the overall national mine action programme in order to assess the EC
portfolios. Feedback suggests these country mission reports have been well-received by the EC
Delegations in those countries and by other stakeholders who have reviewed the drafts.

102

See for example, A sector approach to working with developing countries,
http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/delivering-aid/sector-approach/index_en.htm
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Our impression is that these broad reviews of country mine action programmes will generally be
more valuable to EC Delegations than a regional evaluation. Some of the EC Delegations have
commissioned evaluations of individual projects, which can assess operational and technical
issues and the performance of implementing partners, but which provide less guidance to the
Delegations on their essential task – that of programming EC assistance for mine action in a
particular country over a specific time.
Accordingly, we recommend that, where the size of the mine action portfolio warrants, EC
Delegations should commission periodic evaluations of the overall country programme in the
context of the country’s changing political economy and the evolution of the overall national
mine action programme.103

103

Such evaluations could also be commissioned by a focal point in Brussels or at the regional level. With modest
modification, country programme evaluations could be undertaken as joint exercises with other donors (e.g. EU
member states active in mine action in a country).
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ANNEX 1 – TERMS OF REFERENCE
Regional evaluation of EC-funded mine actions in Africa
2002-2007
1. BACKGROUND
In 2001 the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament adopted two Regulations on the
reinforcement of the EU response against Antipersonnel Landmines (APL).104 These (referred to
collectively as “the Regulation”) laid the foundation of the European integrated and focused
policy.
Article 13, paragraph 1 of the EC Regulation states that: The Commission shall regularly assess
operations financed by the Community in order to establish whether the objectives of the
operations have been achieved and to provide guidelines for improving the effectiveness of future
operations.
The APL Regulation goes on to state: Every three years after entry into force of this Regulation,
the Commission shall submit to the European Parliament an overall assessment of all Community
mine actions… (Article 14)
The EC Mine Action Strategy and Multi-annual Indicative Programme, 2005-2007105 further
specifies that “more specific, geographic, evaluations of EC-funded mine actions, analysing the
results and their impact” will be undertaken to complement the overall assessment.
To implement these provisions, the EC:
1. Commissioned a global assessment of EC mine policy and actions over the period 20022004;
2. Entered into an agreement with The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining
(GICHD) to, inter alia, manage the programme of regional evaluations to identify lessons
learned within EC-funded mine action projects in the following regions:106
• Africa
• Asia-Pacific

• Caucasus-Central Asia
• Europe

• Latin America
• Middle East

The Report from the Global Assessment was issued in March 2005,107 while the agreement with
the GICHD was concluded in December that year.
104

Regulation (EC) 1724/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2001 concerning action
against anti-personnel landmines in developing countries (OJ L 234, 1.9.2001, p.1) and Regulation (EC) 1725/2001 of
the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2001 concerning action against anti-personnel landmines in
third countries other than developing countries (OJ L 234, 1.9.2001, p.6). The provisions are similar and we quote from
Regulation (EC) 1724/2001.
105
This is the second strategy and multi-year indicative programme since the adoption of the EC Regulation: the first
covered the period 2002-04.
106
Additional objectives of the EC-GICHD Agreement are to:
•
provide a repository and dissemination service for reports from mine action evaluations and similar studies;
•
train people from mine affected countries in evaluation;
•
support the participation of key players from mine-affected countries in official meetings relating to the Mine
Ban Treaty (MBT).
107
Gasser, Russell and Robert Keeley, Global Assessment of EC Mine Policy and Actions: 2002-2004.
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2. DESCRIPTION OF THE EVALUATION
The general objective of the Global Assessment was to determine to what extent the objectives
and means set in the APL Regulation had been complied with and used in terms of strategy,
programming, commitments and implementation. The regional evaluations will complement the
Global Assessment by focusing on (i) relevant conclusions and recommendations from the
Global Assessment, and (ii) EC mine action strategy and programming issues at the country
level. Thus, the evaluation will not assess the efficiency, effectiveness, and impact of individual
projects, except to illustrate changes since the Global Assessment or critical programming issues.
Overall objective:
To provide systematic and objective assessments of EC-funded mine actions in Africa to generate
credible and useful lessons for decision-makers, allowing them to improve the planning and
management of existing and future mine action projects, programmes, and policies.
Specific objectives:
− To assess the relevance of EC-funded mine activities vis-à-vis:
o the geographic and thematic priorities defined in the Strategies for 2002-2004 and
2005-2007;
o national and regional needs, strategies, and priorities;
o EC Country Strategy Papers and National Indicative Programmes for mine-affected
countries in Africa;
o EC strategy documents for Africa or major sub-regions in Africa;
− To analyse the allocation of funds among mine-affected states in Africa, and across the
various components of mine action (survey, clearance, MRE, etc.);
− To assess the effectiveness of EC-funded mine action support in:
o addressing the landmine & UXO problems in mine-affected partner countries
o fostering national ownership and the development of local capacities;
o supporting the overall development and rehabilitation priorities/ programmes of the
beneficiary countries;
− To assess the coordination among the EC and other agencies supporting mine action in a
country (national; UN; donors; international NGOs; etc.);
− To assess the impact of deconcentration on the planning and delivery of EC support to mine
action in Africa;
− To assess the potential impact of the end of the specific budget line for anti-personnel
landmines on future mine action support from the EC to Africa;
− To make recommendations to improve the identification, the definition, the implementation
and the impact of EC-funded mine projects;
− To generate recommendations to enhance the opportunities for cross-fertilisation among
mine action programmes in Africa and globally.
Expected results
The evaluation report shall give an overview of EC mine action support to Africa, and to
particular mine-affected countries in Africa, since 2002. It shall incorporate more detailed
assessments of EC mine action support in a limited number of ‘focus country’ cases to illustrate
and support its findings, conclusions, and recommendations. Recommendations will aim in
particular to guide EC personnel in designing and implementing programmes of support to mine
action that complement the actions of other actors, including national authorities, other donors,
and UN agencies.
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3. METHODOLOGY
The evaluation shall entail the following main components of work:
− Preliminary Planning & Data Collection (now underway)
− Desk Research
− Country Missions
o Angola
o Somalia (& Nairobi)
o Sudan
− Analysis and Reporting
Evaluation Team
The Evaluation Team will comprise:
•
•
•
•
•

Ted Paterson, GICHD Head of Evaluation (Team Leader)
Vera Bohle, GICHD Evaluation Officer
Leonie Barnes, GICHD National Mine Action Standards Officer
Mohamed Ahmed, GICHD Regional Coordinator for MENA and East Africa
Pamela Rebelo, Consultant

CVs of each team member are attached in Annex 2.
Country Missions
The proposed timing of the country missions, and the evaluation team members travelling to
each, is as follows:
Country
Angola
Somalia
Sudan

Timing
28 March-5 April*
26 March-3 April*
20-27 March*
10 April-??*

Team Members
Vera Bohle & Pamela Rebelo
Ted Paterson & Mohamed Ahmed
Vera Bohle (to Khartoum)
Leonie Barnes (to Juba & Yei)

* To be confirmed
As the evaluation will not focus on the performance of individual projects, Evaluation Team
members will spend most or all of their time in capitals and major centres to meet with and
collect documents and data from:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

EC delegations
national authorities and officials from national mine action centres
UN agencies supporting mine action
representatives from other major donors to mine action in that country
representatives from mine action operators (local and international)
other key government officials (e.g. representatives from ministries of finance and
planning; regional governments; etc.)
representatives from key regional organisation (where present).

In addition, Ted Paterson and (perhaps) Vera Bohle will attend the joint EC-AU Workshop,
currently planned for April in Addis Ababa, and will take the opportunity to meet with officials
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from the EC Delegation in Addis, Ethiopian mine action officials, and the African Union
secretariat.
Additional data collection
Additional information will be obtained from:
−
−
−

−
−
−
−
−

Review of project documents (project proposals and contracts; mid-term and final reports, as
well as final evaluations, monitoring reports, audit reports, etc., where available;
Interviews with relevant Commission officials (in Brussels);
Questionnaire surveys and some follow-up telephone interviews with project
managers/implementers/recipients of EC funds and projects (Officials in other EC
Delegations, managers of operator organisations, both in organisations’ headquarters and on
the field, and beneficiary countries’ officials, etc.).
EC Country Strategy Papers and National Indicative Programmes.
National Development Plans, Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, and National Mine Action
Strategies from the focus countries
Relevant reports from the UN (including inter-agency assessment mission reports for mine
action) and the World Bank
Recent mine action evaluations commissioned by other agencies
Other sources, as appropriate.

4. OUTPUTS
A detailed evaluation work plan will be prepared and distributed following the preliminary
planning and data collection stage (estimated for 24 February 2007).
A debriefing of preliminary findings and conclusions will be provided to EC officials and other
stakeholders at the end of each country mission.
A draft report will be prepared and distributed for comments within one month of the end of the
joint EC-AU workshop in Addis (dates still to be confirmed).
A final report will be submitted within two weeks of the submission of comments from the EC
delegations, EC in Brussels, and other stakeholders.
All reports will be in English.
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ANNEX 2 – ITINERARY AND LIST OF PEOPLE MET
ANGOLA
Date
Organisation
Persons met
Tuesday 27 March and Wednesday 28 March Pamela Rebelo and Vera Bohle arrive in
Luanda
Thurs. 29
EC Delegation
Dominique Albert, Rural Development Adviser
March
Angola
Walter Viegas, Rural Development
Rogério Castro, Technical Demining Adviser to UTA
CED/INAD/FAA

Eng Leonardo Severino Sapalo, Director General INAD
and member of CED
Dora Domingas Gristavao, Adminstrations Director INAD
Ernesto Chiquito, CED Operations
CNIDAH
Edgar dos Santos Lourenço - Planning Studies and
Operations Assistant
Rita Jesus, Chief of Planning
Manuel Buta, Chief of Operations
UTA
Faustino Lourenco, Chief of Programming
WFP
Bradley Guerrant, Country Director
Friday 30
NPA
Oddvar Bjorknes Resident Representative
March
Rebecca Thomson Director, Demining Programme
Intersos
Gianpaolo Tongiorigi, Programme Manager
HALO Trust
Helen Gray, Project Officer
MgM
Hendrik Ehlers, Director
Carlos Haller da Silva, National Director
MAG
Mark Naftalin, Programme Officer
Monday
Swiss Cooperation
Roland Beutler, Administrator
2 May
Embassy of USA
Doreen P. Bailey, Political Secretary
Nina Maria, Fite Adviser, Political and Economic Affairs
Embassy of Japan
Mitsuo Takahashi, Second Secretary
Embassy of Norway
Paul Sverre Tharaldsen, Second Secretary
UNDP
Alfredo Teixeira, Deputy Resident Representative
Marc Bonnet, Chief Technical Adviser
Tuesday
EC delegation Angola Dominique Albert
3 May
Walter Viegas
João Gabriel Ferreira, Ambassador, Head of Delegation
Wednesday 4 May + Thursday 5 May departure Vera Bohle and Pamela Rebelo
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SOMALIA
Date
Organisation
Persons met
Weekend 24-25 April – Evaluation team arrives Nairobi
Mon. 26
UNDP Somalia
Greg Lindstom, CTA Mine Action
March
Tues. 27
UNDP Somalia
UN Security Briefing (David Lavery, Field
March
Security Coordination Officer
Greg Lindstom, CTA Mine Action
Eric Overvest, Deputy Resident Representative
Sidi Zahabi, Programme Manager, ROLS
Laurel Patterson, Programme Officer ROLS
Wed. 28
EC Delegation – Somalia
Richard Hands, Counsellor
March
Marcelino Benet, Field Officer, Garowe
Danish Demining Group
Nick Bateman, Representative
Thursday 29 April – Evaluation team flies to Hargeisa
Thurs. 29
UNDP Mine Action office,
Mark Frankish, MA Operations Advisor
March
Somaliland
Ali Ugaas, National Mine Action Officer
ROLS, Somaliland
Fatima Ibrahim, Area Coordinator, ROLS
Fri. 30
Somaliland Mine Action
Dr. Ahmed Ali Mah, Programme Manager
March
Centre (SMAC)
Hamoud Ali, Admin & Finance Officer
Tour of SMAC facilities
Survey Action Centre (SAC)
Nidaa Zein, Survey Manager
Handicap International
Dahib Mohamed Odwaa, MRE Project Manager
DDG
Craig McDiarmid, Operations Manager
Sat. 31
Ministry of Defence
Aden Mohamed Mire, Minister
March
National Demining Agency
Ismail Hashi Madar, Chairman
HALO Trust
Neil Ferrao, Somaliland Desk Officer
Christopher Pym, Operations Manager
Hassan Kossar, Operations Officer
Lulay Goitom, Office/GIS Officer
European Commission
Andre ?, Regional Coordinator
Sun. 1 April
Police
Mohamed Segadi Herla, Commissioner
Omer Abdallah, EOD Commander
SMAC
Debriefing
UNDP Mine Action office
Debriefing
Monday, 2 April – Evaluation team flies to Garowe
Mon. 2 April
Puntland Mine Action Centre
Abdirizak Isse Husein, Programme Manager
(PMAC)
Abdiaziz Yousuf Ahmed, IMSMA/Ops Officer
EC Area Office
Marcelino Benet, Field Officer, Garowe
Tues. 3 April Ministry of Planning
Ali Ahmed Gamuti, Vice Minister
Ali Yusuf Hosh, Director General
Ministry of Interior
Mohamud Sofe Hassan, Director General
ROLS Area Office
Abdirahim Abikar, Area Coordinator
Wed. 4 April Police Department
Col. Sayid Jama Abdulli, Vice Commissioner
Major Abshir Osman Ali, EOD Commander
??, EOD Team Leader
Daraweesh
Yasin Salad Galeyr, Chief, Operations
Thursday, 5 April – Ted Paterson flies to Nairobi, Ahmed Mohamed remains in Garowe
Fri. 6 April
UNDP Somalia
Greg Lindstom, CTA Mine Action
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NORTH SUDAN
Date
Organisation
Persons met
st
21 March Evaluation officer Departs Berlin, arrives in Khartoum
Thursday 22 EC Delegation
Achim Ladwig, First Secretary
March
Mustafa Yassin, Programme Assistant
Friday 23,
EC Delegation
Achim Ladwig
Saturday 24
March
Sun. 25
MAG
Frederic Maio, Project Managaer North Sudan
March
EC Delegation
Maria Horno Comet, Operations Coordinator
UK Department for
Alicia Herbert, Social Development Advisor
International Development
(Sudan)
WFP
Marian Yun, Donor Relations Officer
Mon. 26
JASMAR
Dr. Hussein Elobeid, General Manager
March
UNDP
Qadeem Khan Tariq, Senior Technical Advisor
NMAC
Baballa Biraima Baballa, Deputy Director
Yousif M. Osman
UNMAO
Jim Pansegrouw, Programme Manager
Jacobus Nieuwoudt, Operations Officer
Akiko Kobayakawa, Programme Officer
Mohammed Kabir, Chief of Information
Christina Greene, External Relations
Ben Wilkinson, National QA Coordinator
Tuesday 27
EC Delegation
Paul Symonds, Food Security Coordinator
March
Eulogio Montijano, Rural Development
Coordinator
Worldbank
Joseph Hoenen, Senior Operations Officer
FSD
David Tooke, Deputy Programme Manager
Embassy of Japan
Yoichiro Toda, Attaché
EC Delegation
Achim Ladwig, Mustafa Yassin
Wednesday, 28th March – Evaluation officer flies to Angola

SOUTH SUDAN
Date
Organisation
Persons met
th
th
11-13 April Evaluation officer Departs Geneva, arrives Juba 13 April
Friday. 13
UNMAO Regional South
Simon Porter, Deputy Programme Manager
April
EU Regional Office
Brigitta Brosskinsky
Sat.14 April
Juba
Simon Porter, UNMAO
UlrichTietze, Technical Adviser, UNDP
Bodil Jacobsen, Programme Manager, DDG
Tommy Thompson, WFP, Roads Manager
NPA – Rune Kristian Andersson, Programme
Manager
Sun. 15 April Juba
MAG, Phillip Halsfield, Technical Operations
Manager
Mon. 16
UNMAO Juba
Simon Porter, Deputy Programme Manager,
April
Paul Eldred, Regional Operations Officer
Danish Demining Group
Bodil Jacobsen, Programme Manager, DDG
ECHO Regional Office
James Duku, Programme Officer
Tues.17
New Sudan Mine Action
Mr Jukuch Barach Barach
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April

Directorate
Ms Margaret XXXX
FSD
Alex van Roy, Programme Manager
Wed. 18
Ministry of Roads and
Dr Desmond Wanni, Secretary
April
transport
Ministry of Finance
Cancelled
Ministry of Agriculture
Cancelled
UNDP
UlrichTietze, Technical Adviser, UNDP
Thursday, 19th April – Evaluation officer flies to Nairobi
Fri. 20 April
WFP
Tommy Thompson, WFP
MAG
Abigail Hartley, Programme Manager, MAG
Sat.21 April
Nairobi
Research
rd
22 – 23 April – Evaluation officer returns to Geneva (flight delayed by 10 hours)
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ANNEX 3 – DOCUMENTS CONSULTED
International Declarations and Agreements
Africa-EU Strategic Partnership, and the Action Plan for 2008-2010
(http://www.eu2007.pt/NR/rdonlyres/D449546C-BF42-4CB3-B566407591845C43/0/071206jsapenlogos_formatado.pdf)
Cotonou Agreement, 2000
(http://ec.europa.eu/development/geographical/cotonou/cotonoudoc_en.cfm)
Lomé Convention, 1975 (http://ec.europa.eu/development/geographical/lomegen_en.cfm)
Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, 2005
(http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/11/41/34428351.pdf)
Strategy for Africa: An EU regional political partnership for peace, security and development in
the Horn of Africa, 20 Oct. 2006 (http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/r13004.htm)
Transitional Federal Charter of the Somali Republic, January 2004
(http://www.somalia.cc/article_read.asp?item=6)
Literature and Evaluations
African Security Review (2000), The Southern African Development Community and the
Landmine Ban Treaty, Richard Sherman & Noel Stott, Published in Vol 9 No 5/6
(http://www.iss.co.za/ASR/9No5And6/Sherman.html)
World Bank (2005), Capacity Building in Africa: An OED Evaluation of World Bank Support,
World Bank, Washington D.C. (http://www.worldbank.org/oed/africa_capacity_building/)
DAC (2002) Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results Based Management, OECD, Paris
(http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/29/21/2754804.pdf)
Da Câmara, S. Lehtinen, T. and A. Sherrif (2001) The EU’s Response to Conflict Affected
Countries, Operational Guidance for the Implementation of the Cotonou Agreement, Discussion
Paper 31, Maastricht, ECDPM
(http://www.ecdpm.org/Web_ECDPM/Web/Content/FileStruc.nsf/index.htm?ReadForm&D09C8
2C0173EE550C1256C8B0035F457 )
Disch, A. and A. Karlsen (2004). Evaluation of the Global Landmine Survey Process, ScanteamDemex, Oslo.
Eaton, Robert, C. Horwood, and N. Niland (1997) The Development of Indigenous Mine Action
Capacities, DHA.
Gasser, R. and R. Keeley (2005) Global Assessment of EC Mine Policy and Actions: 2002-2004,
ATOS Origin, (http://www.pedz.uni-mannheim.de/daten/edzh/az/05/global_assessment_final.pdf)
GICHD (2005) Review of Ten Years Assistance to Mine Action in Mozambique, GICHD, Geneva.
GICHD (2007) Evaluation of NPA’s Humanitarian Mine Action Project and Review of
Ethiopia’s Mine Action Programme, GICHD, Geneva.
Isaksen, J., I. Samset, and F. Pacheco (2006) Mid-term Review of the Angola Programme of
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Norwegian People’s Aid, Chr. Michelsen Institute
(http://www.cmi.no/publications/file/?2126=mid-term-review-of-the-angola-programme-of)
Martina Fors (2003), Mission Report, Addis Ababa, 25 Feb. 2003
Smillie, Ian and Larry Minear, 2003, The Quality of Money: Donor Behavior in Humanitarian
Financing, Feinstein International Famine Center, Tufts University
(http://ocha.unog.ch/fts/exception-docs/FTSDocuments/The_Quality_of_MoneyDonor_Behavior_in_Humanitarian_Financing.pdf)
Sudan Unified Mission Plan www.sudanig.org
World Bank (2005) Engaging Civil Society Organizations in Conflict- Affected and Fragile
States: Three African Country Case Studies, World Bank, Washington D.C.
(http://lnweb18.worldbank.org/ESSD/sdvext.nsf/67ByDocName/EngagingCivilSocietyOrganizati
onsinConflictAffectedandFragileStatesThreeAfricanCountryCaseStudies/$FILE/Engaging+CSOs+in+ConflictAffected+and+Fragile+States+Final.pdf)
World Bank (2003) Transitional Support Strategy for the Republic of Angola, World Bank,
Washington D.C. (http://wwwwds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2003/03/22/000094946_0303
1304013163/Rendered/PDF/multi0page.pdf)
World Bank, 2005, Interim Strategy Note for the Republic of Angola, World Bank, Washington
D.C. (http://wwwwds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2005/02/18/000012009_2005
0218142854/Rendered/PDF/31128.pdf)
World Bank, 2006, Angola - Oil, broad-based growth, and equity - country economic
memorandum, World Bank, Washington D.C. (http://wwwwds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2006/10/24/000090341_2006
1024104820/Rendered/PDF/35362.pdf)
World Bank/UNDP, 2002, Somalia Socio Economic Survey 2002, World Bank/UNDP, Nairobi
(http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTSOMALIA/Resources/swb_complete_report.pdf)
World Bank, 2006, MDTF- National/ MDTF-South, Project Proposal document for a proposed
grant in the amount of US$33.0Million to the Government of National Unity for the Fifth
Population Census of Sudan, World Bank, Washington D.C.
Policy Documents European Community
All available country Strategy Papers and National Indicative Programmes for the period 20022007 (http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/sp/2002.htm)
All available Regional Strategy Papers for 2002-2006
(http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/sp/2002.htm)
EC Council Regulation (EC) 1724/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July
2001 concerning action against anti-personnel landmines in developing countries
(http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/mine/docs/reg_1724.pdf)
EC Regulation (EC) 1725/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2001
concerning action against anti-personnel landmines in third countries other than developing
countries (http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/mine/docs/reg_1725.pdf)
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EC Council Regulation No 381/2001 (http://www.legaltext.ee/text/en/T60007.htm)
European Community, The European Roadmap towards a Zero Victim Target, The EC Mine
Action Strategy & Multi-annual Indicative Programming 2005-2007,
(http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/mine/docs/strategy_0507_en.pdf)
Policy Coherence for Development: Accelerating progress towards attaining the Millennium
Development Goals, Communication from the Commission to the Council, The EU Parliament
and the European Economic and Social Committee, April 12 2005,
(http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/r12534.htm)
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